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NINE PERSPECTIVES ON LIVING 
ORIGINALISM 
Jack M. Balkin* 
This Article responds to the nine contributions to the symposium 
on Living Originalism.  It considers nine different aspects of the ar-
gument in the book: (1) why constitutions around the world contain 
vague and abstract language, and how a constitution’s choice of lan-
guage connects to the purposes of a constitution; (2) the book’s theory 
of democratic legitimacy; (3) how the book’s argument applies to 
constitutional cultures outside the United States, and the relationship 
between original and implied meanings; (4) the differences between 
the book’s theory of constitutional interpretation and that of Ronald 
Dworkin; (5) whether the book’s account of legal principles is con-
sistent with legal positivism; (6) the book’s account of the U.S. Consti-
tution as both “fallen” and as “higher law”; (7) whether a 
“protestant” constitutional culture—in which citizens feel authorized 
to state what the Constitution means for themselves—benefits or 
harms democratic legitimacy; (8) the book’s account of the original 
meaning of “commerce” as “intercourse,” and Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate networks of transportation and communication; 
and (9) the book’s message for living constitutionalists and constitu-
tional originalists. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My thanks to the University of Illinois Law Review, and to Larry 
Solum and Kurt Lash, for assembling such an outstanding group of 
scholars to comment on Living Originalism.1  To respond to everything 
in these excellent articles would require a book in itself and would cer-
tainly try any reader’s patience.  Instead, I have focused on a central idea 
in each of the nine essays.  I begin by briefly outlining a few of the key 
themes in Living Originalism. 
Living Originalism argues that the best versions of originalism and 
living constitutionalism, correctly understood, are compatible rather than 
 
 *  Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School.  My 
thanks to Sandy Levinson for comments on a previous draft. 
 1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011). 
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opposed.  The best form of originalism, which I call framework 
originalism, holds that the Constitution is a basic plan for politics.  It is a 
framework for government that is incomplete at the outset, and it must 
be built out over time by successive generations through the processes of 
constitutional construction. 
What most people call “constitutional interpretation” actually com-
bines two separate functions.  The first function is ascertaining the mean-
ing of the text.  For example, is the meaning of “commerce” in Article I, 
Section 8 limited to the trade of goods or commodities, or does it mean, 
as John Marshall says in Gibbons v. Ogden, “intercourse?2”  Does the 
word “writings” in the progress clause of Article I, Section 8 refer only to 
written materials, or is it a nonliteral usage that allows Congress to create 
copyrights in paintings and maps?  This task is interpretation-as-ascer- 
tainment of meaning. 
The second function—and perhaps the more important—is imple-
menting the text through doctrines, practices, laws, and institutions.  Ex-
amples of constitutional constructions are the actual malice rule of New 
York Times v. Sullivan,3 the Social Security Act of 1937,4 and the Presi-
dent’s ability to veto legislation due to mere policy disagreement rather 
than constitutional objection.5 
When we study the practices of constitutional interpretation, there-
fore, we must pay attention both to interpretation as ascertainment of 
meaning and interpretation as construction.  Moreover, we must also pay 
attention to state-building constructions created by the political branches 
that create new governmental powers and functions.  Normally these re-
ly, either implicitly or explicitly, on views about the proper interpretation 
and construction of the Constitution—for example, when Congress cre-
ates a new administrative agency, passes a new law premised on its con-
stitutional powers, or establishes an understanding or convention with 
the executive branch.  Together, all of the various constructions, institu-
tions, laws, and practices that have grown up around the text over time 
form what we might call the “Constitution-in-practice.” 
Originalism in its various forms maintains (1) that some feature of 
the Constitution is fixed at the time of adoption, (2) that this fixed ele-
ment cannot be altered except through subsequent amendment, and (3) 
 
 2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824). 
 3. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 4. Social Security Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).   
 5. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 12 tbl.1.2, 99, 133 (1999).  Whittington defines constitutional interpreta-
tion as the “process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text,” whereas constitutional con-
struction is “essentially creative, though the foundations for the ultimate structure are taken as given.  
The text is not discarded but brought into being.”  KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 (1999). 
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that this fixed element matters for correct interpretation.6  Framework 
originalism argues that what is fixed is the basic constitutional frame-
work.  That framework consists of the original semantic meanings of the 
words in the text (including any generally recognized terms of art) and 
the adopters’ choice of rules, standards, and principles to limit, guide, 
and channel future constitutional construction. 
The U.S. Constitution contains hardwired rules, like the rule that 
each state is represented by two senators, and the rule that the President 
must be at least thirty-five years of age.  It contains standards, like the 
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches and seizures must not 
be “unreasonable.”  It also contains principles—for example, the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.  And on many 
other issues the text is silent, leaving matters to future construction. 
When the text states a determinate rule, we apply the rule today, 
because that is what the text says.  Where the text states a standard, we 
apply the standard, because that is what the text says.  Where the text 
states a principle, we apply the principle, because that is what the text 
says.  And where the text is silent, we must build out the functions of 
government as best we can. 
Framework originalism assumes that the choice of rules, standards, 
principles, and silences in the constitutional text is deliberate.  It ascribes 
reasons to constitutional adopters for their choice of language.  Constitu-
tional adopters choose hardwired rules because they want to limit discre-
tion.  They choose vague standards or abstract principles because they 
want to channel political judgment but delegate the task of construction 
and application to future generations.  And constitutional adopters usu-
ally remain silent about a subject because they cannot agree on how to 
resolve a particular issue and/or want to leave the question open to fu-
ture political deliberations. 
Fidelity to the Constitution requires fidelity to the original meaning 
of the text, and to the choice of rules, principles, and standards in the 
text.  It requires us to be faithful both to the principles that are stated in 
the text and those that we understand to be presupposed by the text or 
underlie the text, and it requires us to build out constitutional construc-
tions that best apply the text and its associated rules, standards, and prin-
ciples to our current circumstances.  We might call this approach to con-
stitutional interpretation “the method of text, rule, standard, and 
principle;” however, as a convenient shorthand, I call it the method of 
text and principle.  The method of text and principle is both originalist, 
because it requires fidelity to original meaning, and living constitutional-
 
 6. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 2 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244. 
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ist, because it gives a prominent role to constitutional construction by 
later generations. 
The distribution of rules, standards, principles, and silences in the 
Constitution’s text makes sense if a constitution is an initial framework 
for governance that sets politics in motion and that has to be filled out 
over time.  Although the framework does not change without an Arti-
cle V amendment, what is built on or around the framework can change, 
and has changed almost continually from the Founding to the present 
day. 
The American people continually build new doctrines, practices, 
and institutions on top of the basic framework.  These processes of con-
stitutional construction are living constitutionalism.  Thus, living consti-
tutionalism is not a method of correct interpretation that is opposed to 
originalism.  Rather, living constitutionalism is the process of building 
out the Constitution-in-practice through laws, doctrines, institutions, and 
practices.  There is no contradiction between originalism and living con-
stitutionalism.  Originalism requires fidelity to the framework; the pro-
cesses of living constitutionalism build on the framework.  The two are 
opposite sides of the same coin.   
Although fidelity to the framework requires fidelity to the original 
meaning of the text, the word meaning itself has multiple meanings.  It 
could refer to the semantic meaning of the words of the text, how people 
expected the text would be applied to particular situations, the specific 
purposes people had in adopting the text, or the cultural associations of 
the text.  Framework originalism argues that what is fixed at the time of 
adoption, and continues in force over time, is the original semantic 
meaning of the text—what the words meant at the time of adoption, tak-
ing into account any generally recognized terms of art.  The original 
meaning does not include how people at the time of adoption would have 
intended or expected the text to be applied, or how broadly or narrowly 
they would have articulated the principles and standards found in the 
text.  I call these views original expected applications.   
Thus, the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments 
clause is not limited to those punishments that people living in 1791 
would have expected it would apply to.  The First Amendment’s guaran-
tee of freedom of speech is not limited to protections that people in 1791 
would have supported.  These expectations are not part of the frame-
work.  They are the initial constructions of the text.  They may be helpful 
in forming constructions for the present, but adopting these constructions 
is our choice—for which we must take responsibility—and not the 
adopters’ command. 
We always apply the rules, standards, and principles in the Constitu-
tion in our own circumstances.  But hardwired rules normally will be ap-
plied in the same way over time.  Standards like “unreasonable” or ab-
stract principles like “equal protection,” by contrast, may be applied 
BALKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/25/2012  2:14 PM 
No. 3] NINE PERSPECTIVES ON LIVING ORIGINALISM 819 
differently in different times and circumstances, especially if the stan-
dards are vague and the principles are abstract.  Moreover, the Constitu-
tion permits the development of new institutions, laws, and practices—
like the Federal Reserve Bank, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, and Social Security—that will shape constitutional 
and political understandings in the future, often in unexpected ways. 
The method of text and principle does not treat the purposes, ex-
pectations, or intentions of the Framing generation as irrelevant.  Rather, 
they are a resource for construction, which we use to create constructions 
in our own time.  We look to the past for meaning, advice, and guidance.  
We want to know how others have understood the project and its entail-
ments.  We care about the views of Framers and Founders because our 
past is a source of shared meanings and collective memories as well as a 
set of judgments about how to go forward; and we adopt, modify, rein-
terpret, and reject these meanings, memories, and judgments given our 
own situation and circumstances. 
The Constitution is an intergenerational plan for politics, and each 
generation must do its part to keep the plan going.  Americans do this 
through constitutional politics.  They mobilize and attempt to persuade 
each other about the best way to fulfill the Constitution’s promises and 
commitments, realize its plan, and further its goals.  Often they disagree 
about this, and the Constitution-in-practice provides a platform in which 
they can argue about its proper construction and the right way to go for-
ward.  Thus, the Constitution is not only an initial platform for building 
out a democratic state, it is also a platform for persuasion, in which suc-
cessive waves of political and social mobilizations invoke the Constitu-
tion and its text and principles and seek to persuade their fellow citizens.  
Many of the most important features of our current constitutional regime 
are the result of these Many waves of mobilizations and counter-
mobilizations, and the state-building constructions they gave rise to.  Per-
suasion, both cultural and political, is a key feature in constitutional 
change. 
Because people often disagree about the best way to implement the 
Constitution, the Constitution-in-practice will often seem unjust to many 
of its citizens.  Sometimes it will seem unjust to both sides of a dispute, 
like gay rights or abortion.  All constitutions are flawed and imperfect—
the product of clashing interests and moral compromises—both at the 
outset and as they are built out.  The U.S. Constitution is no different.  
For the constitutional project to be legitimate, people must believe that it 
is sufficiently worthy of respect to justify the state’s coercion of them-
selves and others.  Or, if it is not currently worthy of respect, people must 
have faith that, despite its current imperfections, it can become so over 
time. 
For people who think the system is adequate just as it is, constitu-
tional faith is not very difficult, or even very important.  It is easy to be-
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lieve in the Constitution’s respect-worthiness if you believe that there are 
no serious injustices in the United States or that any injustices that exist 
are not the fault of the way people have interpreted and implemented 
the Constitution.  But for those who find themselves on the losing side of 
an important constitutional debate, who believe that current injustices 
are serious and that the country is going dangerously in the wrong direc-
tion, constitutional faith is necessary.  For such people, fidelity to the 
constitutional project—and to the Constitution itself—requires a certain 
degree of faith in the eventual redemption of the Constitution.  This re-
demption is by no means guaranteed, and it is never complete and never 
perfect; but the possibility of constitutional redemption underwrites the 
legitimacy of the Constitution, especially for constitutional dissenters and 
those who feel that the Constitution-in-practice is imperfect and unjust.  
It is easy to have faith in a constitution that is treating you and those you 
care about well.  It takes a leap of faith when you live in a country whose 
leaders are not listening to you and are committing serious injustices. 
Framework originalism maintains that when the Constitution uses 
vague standards or abstract principles, we must apply them to present-
day circumstances.  And when adopters use language that delegates con-
stitutional construction to future generations, fidelity to the Constitution 
requires future generations to engage in constitutional construction.  
Constitutional fidelity, in other words, requires that we take up the task 
of figuring out what the Constitution’s promises mean in our time. 
Constitutional fidelity is creative activity, not passive obedience.  
Each generation must take up the great work of constitutional construc-
tion, “in Order,” as the Preamble tells us, “to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common 
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liber-
ty to ourselves and our Posterity.”7  This task was not completed in 1787, 
or 1791, or 1868.  It is not completed today.  If the Constitution is to be 
our constitution, and not simply a law imposed on us by an alien past, we 
must put ourselves on its side, make its project our own, identify with it, 
and do our part, just as others have done before us and others will do af-
ter us.  We do not stand in a privileged position in history.  We do not 
know whether what we are doing now in the name of the Constitution 
will be judged good or evil by later generations.  Much of what we do will 
be discarded in the future, just as we now view many past constructions 
as wrong or unjust.  Nevertheless, we cannot shirk the responsibility of 
building out the Constitution—at least, if we continue to regard the Con-
stitution as our plan for politics and seek to further it today. 
Modern conservative originalists, fearful that vague standards and 
abstract principles in the text will give later generations too much discre-
tion, have tried to limit the scope of the Constitution’s standards and 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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principles by looking to how the adopters would have applied the text, or 
by deriving principles (and fixing their appropriate level of generality) 
based on evidence of original expected applications.  In other words, 
they have tried to make vague standards and abstract principles into 
something a bit more like determinate rules.  Doing so makes originalism 
unworkable, because original expectations are often inconsistent with the 
modern state, both with respect to constitutional powers and constitu-
tional liberties.  This leads many modern conservative originalists to ad-
mit a wide range of exceptions for precedents, practices, and institutions 
that are inconsistent with their theory of original meaning. 
To maintain political credibility, therefore, conservative originalists 
have accepted a wide variety of precedents and practices they consider 
inconsistent with original meaning and have treated them as settled.  This 
includes most of the modern administrative and regulatory state that 
came with the New Deal, the modern presidency, the National Security 
State, and significant portions of modern understandings about civil 
rights and civil liberties.  Doing this requires what Justice Antonin Scalia 
has aptly called a “pragmatic exception” to originalism: “[t]he whole 
function of the doctrine” of stare decisis, he explains, “is to make us say 
that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless to be held true, 
all in the interest of stability.”8 
The difficulty, of course, is that as time goes on, these pragmatic ex-
ceptions proliferate, so that the Constitution-in-practice becomes further 
and further removed from what conservative originalism considers the 
legitimate basis of constitutional interpretation.  If these deviations really 
are mistakes, they should be narrowly construed and certainly not ex-
panded.  But the problem is that contemporary Americans do not see 
most of these “mistakes”—like equal rights for women, the modern con-
ception of free speech, the right of blacks and whites to marry each oth-
er, the federal government’s power to establish Social Security, and fed-
eral power to pass much of modern civil rights, environmental, consumer 
protection, and labor legislation—as mistakes at all.  They regard these 
features of the Constitution-in-practice as valuable features of the Amer-
ican system of government.  Treating women’s constitutional rights as a 
mistake that it is too late to go back and correct does not capture the way 
most Americans feel about their Constitution.  It is a serious embarrass-
ment for originalism. 
Framework originalism does not encounter this problem because it 
does not agree that expected applications (or principles derived from ex-
pected applications) are part of original meaning.  They are resources for 
construction, but not commands.  Evidence of how the adopting genera-
tion would have understood and applied the text is simply one among 
 
 8. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 129, 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
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many different modalities of argument that we are permitted to use when 
interpreting the Constitution and applying it to contemporary problems. 
Fidelity to original semantic meaning is consistent with a wide range 
of possible future constitutional constructions that implement the origi-
nal meaning and that add new institutional structures and political prac-
tices that do not conflict with it.  Constitutional constructions implement 
the Constitution through developing judicial doctrines and building out 
political and legal institutions to serve constitutional purposes.  Both 
judges and the political branches participate in constitutional construc-
tion.  They develop doctrines and institutions that fill in the gaps of the 
constitutional system, build new capacities, create new government pro-
grams and functions, flesh out the Constitution’s abstract standards and 
principles, and apply the Constitution to new circumstances.  This pro-
cess of constitutional construction is living constitutionalism. 
II. WHY DO CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN  
ABSTRACT AND VAGUE LANGUAGE? 
Today most conservative originalists agree with me that we are not 
bound by original expected applications, only by original meaning.  But 
the way they cash out original meaning often leads them to model it fair-
ly closely on original expected applications—which includes not only 
how specific cases would be decided, but also how people at the time of 
adoption would have articulated the relevant constitutional principles.9  
John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport’s article in this symposium is a 
good example of how this conflation occurs. 
McGinnis and Rappaport accuse me of committing what they call 
the “abstract meaning fallacy,” that is, “conclud[ing] that possibly ab-
stract language has an abstract meaning without sufficiently considering 
and weighing the alternative possibilities.”10  When we look at their arti-
cle more closely, however, we will discover that there is no fallacy in the 
sense of an error of logic.  Rather, there is a disagreement between us 
about how to understand constitutional language.  Behind that disagree-
ment, in turn, is a deeper disagreement about the purposes of a constitu-
tion, and the sources of constitutional legitimacy.  This becomes obvious 
when McGinnis and Rappaport restate the fallacy later in their article: 
“The fallacy involves an inference that a constitutional provision has an 
abstract original meaning that operates to delegate decision-making au-
thority to future decision makers because the provision employs what 
seems to be abstract language.”11  That is, the fallacy involves adopting 
 
 9. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
 10. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 737, 739.  
 11. Id. at 741. 
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the very theory of constitutions and constitutional language that I argue 
for in Living Originalism! 
McGinnis and Rappaport agree with me that some terms in a con-
stitution are generally recognized terms of art.  An example would be 
“Letters of Marque and Reprisal” in Article I, Section 8.12  We also agree 
that historical research may be necessary to determine whether the Con-
stitution refers to generally recognized terms of art, and whether lan-
guage that might appear abstract to us actually embraces a narrower or 
more specific concept.  Of course, historical inquiry might have the op-
posite effect.  As discussed below, I argue that the original meaning of 
“commerce” is “intercourse,” which has a somewhat broader meaning 
than “trade,” because it includes transportation and communication net-
works.13 
Finally, the three of us agree that historical research may also be 
necessary to determine whether a legal norm is a rule, standard, or prin-
ciple.  McGinnis and Rappaport point out that some texts that look like 
abstract principles might actually be abstract or general rules.14  Con-
versely, I have argued that some texts that look like rules, like the com-
pact clause, might actually be principles or standards.15 
We part company in how we understand abstract terms like “equal 
protection” and “freedom of speech.”  I believe that such language must 
be worked out through constitutional constructions that may change over 
time.  Although the original semantic meaning of the words “equal pro-
tection of the laws” remains the same as it was in 1868, how we apply the 
guarantee may change.  By contrast, McGinnis and Rappaport believe 
that abstract terms, like “cruel and unusual punishments,” “freedom of 
speech,” and “equal protection of the laws,” have a legal meaning that is 
also their original meaning.  They believe that we should treat these 
terms in much the same way as “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s concept of original legal meanings is re-
ally just another name for the initial constructions offered by people in 
the adopters’ generation.  McGinnis and Rappaport, however, reject the 
distinction between interpretation and construction, and therefore be-
lieve that these contemporaneous constructions are part of original 
meaning. 
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that original meaning includes what 
they call original interpretive methods, and, as we will see shortly, that 
theory in turn rests on a still deeper theory about how constitutions work 
and why originalism is the best method of interpretation for a constitu-
tion.  McGinnis and Rappaport are not always very clear about what  
these original interpretive methods are—indeed, their interpretive theory 
 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 114–38. 
 14. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 747–51 (offering examples). 
 15. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 47–48, 349–50 n.12. 
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needs to be fleshed out in considerably more detail.  Nevertheless, from 
the present article and from their previous writings,16 we can gather that 
original interpretive methods include the canons of statutory construc-
tion inherited from the common law as well as the common lawyer’s 
toolkit of arguments and methods as they existed at the time of adoption 
for each particular part of the Constitution.  That would be 1789 for the 
original Constitution, 1791 for the Bill of Rights, 1868 for the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1961 for the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and so on. 
Now many of these methods are the same as the ones we have to-
day.  To be sure, there may be a few differences: for example, in 1787, 
arguments from legislative history or original intentions were not gener-
ally employed.17  Instead, lawyers generally looked to the intent or pur-
poses of a statute through an inspection of its text.  But the familiar cate-
gories of argument and the canons of construction are remarkably similar 
to the ones we use today.18 
In Living Originalism, I argue that lawyers can and should use all of 
the traditional resources of lawyers both in ascertaining original meaning 
and in creating constitutional constructions that implement original 
meaning.19  So today, lawyers may make structural arguments, inspect 
dictionary definitions, invoke traditional rules of statutory construction, 
look to the history of previous readings and interpretations, build on 
previous precedents (both judicial and nonjudicial), make appeals to na-
tional ethos, and take into account prudence and consequences.  All of 
these tools were available to common-law lawyers at the time of the 
Founding; indeed, as Philip Bobbitt has explained, the reason why we use 
these tools today is that they were inherited from the common law.20  
When contemporary lawyers use these traditional tools, however, they 
may develop constructions very different from those the adopters would 
have expected or desired.  One reason is that contemporary lawyers may 
draw on precedents and constructions throughout history, not merely 
those contemporaneous with ratification.  Another reason is that history 
will often look different to us as we move forward in time.  So lawyers in 
 
 16. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
 17. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 
897–98 (1985). 
 18. McGinnis and Rappaport might disagree with this last statement and insist that we do not 
use similar interpretive methods today.  I would respectfully disagree—in my view, American lawyers 
are still very much in the common-law tradition and, with only a few exceptions, still use the same mo-
dalities and the same canons.  But this merely suggests that there can be good-faith disputes about how 
exactly to characterize these interpretive methods and the proper level of generality to describe them.  
As a result, disputes about original interpretive methods will tend to replicate disputes about constitu-
tional meaning at a different level of inquiry. 
 19. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 17, 46, 89, 129, 205, 256–57, 333, 341–42 (explaining that inter-
preters should use all of the traditional modalities of constitutional argument). 
 20. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–8 (1982); 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8, 12–13, 24 (1991).  
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2003 might conclude that gays deserve legal protection under the Four-
teenth Amendment even though lawyers in 1868 would not. 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory of original-methods originalism, 
however, makes a different and much stronger claim than this.  By “orig-
inal methods,” they do not simply mean that we should use the same 
methods and modalities of legal argument that well-trained lawyers at 
the time of the adoption of the text would have used.  That in itself is not 
a very significant requirement, for these methods are part of our con-
temporary legal culture.  What they mean is that we should use these 
methods in the same way that lawyers at the time of adoption would have 
used them to generate legal meanings.  That is, the legal meaning of 
“Cruel and Unusual Punishments” is the construction that a hypothetical 
well-trained lawyer in 1791, using the interpretive methods of that time, 
would have produced.21  The goal is to retrace such a lawyer’s steps and 
consider the same evidence that well-trained lawyers would have em-
ployed at the time of adoption in 1791 (or 1868) to generate legal mean-
ing.  As a result, the contemporaneous legal opinions of well-trained 
lawyers at the time of adoption, while not necessarily conclusive in all re-
spects, are very strong evidence of original legal meaning. 
That is why McGinnis and Rappaport can argue that the mere fact 
that constitutional language appears vague or abstract today is irrelevant.  
Vagueness arises because of uncertainty about “whether or not a term 
extends to a proposed application.”22  But lawyers in 1791 might not have 
been uncertain.  Moreover, the interpretive rules at the time of the 
Founding required that where language is vague or uncertain interpret-
ers should pick the meaning that is most likely given “the relevant 
originalist evidence—evidence based on text, structure, history, and in-
tent—and select the interpretation that was supported more strongly by 
the evidence.”23  Thus, if lawyers at the time of adoption would have un-
derstood constitutional language as more likely to reach some applica-
tions but not others, “there is no legal ambiguity or vagueness, regardless 
of whether there is vagueness or ambiguity in the ordinary language.”24 
 
 21. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 746 (“[T]he original meaning approach requires 
that [ambiguity or vagueness] be resolved based on the interpretive rules that existed at the time.  This 
is how the reasonable and knowledgeable interpreter, employing the original meaning approach, 
would resolve the question.”) (footnote omitted); see id. at 747–48, 764 (arguing that the due process 
clause has the meaning that was historically settled at the time of adoption); id. at 750 (arguing for 
“pin[ning] down” meaning by appealing to “the meanings developed through previous legal traditions 
and processes”); id. at 747 n.36 (“[W]e believe that the original-methods approach best captures the 
actual meaning of the Constitution, because the enactors would have understood the Constitution 
against the background of the relevant interpretive rules of the time.”); see also id. at 748 nn.41–43 
(listing examples of historically concretized legal meanings). 
 22. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 16, at 774. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  See also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 748 nn.41–43 (offering examples of 
historically informed interpretations that ask what the legal meaning of seemingly vague and abstract 
clauses would have been at the time of adoption).  
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This approach leads McGinnis and Rappaport to equate original 
meaning to something very close to original expected application.  Origi-
nal expected application, after all, concerns how adopters expected the 
constitution’s language would be applied.  And McGinnis and Rappaport 
are interested in whether a constitutional term extends to a proposed ap-
plication.25  Lawyers at the time of adoption might have had a range of 
different views on these questions, but some were more likely than oth-
ers, and the most likely interpretation is precisely what we should be 
looking for.  Modern constructions outside this range are not consistent 
with legal meaning.  Thus, although McGinnis and Rappaport agree with 
me that original meaning is not the same thing as original expected appli-
cations, their model of original interpretive methods sticks fairly closely 
to original expected application, because it sticks closely to the views and 
expectations of adoption-era lawyers. 
Under McGinnis and Rappaport’s model, future interpreters may 
not create new constructions that vary from the legal meaning that well-
trained lawyers in 1791 (or 1868) would have understood and recognized.  
Although not all lawyers would have agreed on all questions, we may not 
use that limited range of disagreement to impose interpretations that no 
well-educated lawyer at the time of adoption would have thought rea-
sonable.  Thus, the set of reasonable constructions (or legal meanings, in 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s parlance) available at the time of adoption 
more or less fixes the scope of permissible interpretation today. 
To be sure, changes in technology or factual context might be rele-
vant to how we apply original legal meaning—for example, in the case of 
railroads, airplanes, or electronic media.  Nevertheless, McGinnis and 
Rappaport insist that changes in moral judgments from time of adoption 
to the present day should not affect the original legal meaning—for ex-
ample, changed moral views should not affect whether women or gays 
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment or whether the right to use 
contraceptives is a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States.  
As McGinnis and Rappaport explain, we are trying to understand the 
adopters’ judgments about the proper boundaries of constitutional gov-
ernment, and if we treat too many of the adopters’ moral judgments as 
mistaken, we have likely failed to grasp their legal meaning.26 
Thus, McGinnis and Rappaport reject Living Originalism’s central 
distinction between interpretation and construction.  They do not believe 
that anybody in 1787 thought that vague or abstract language either in-
vited or required construction, either by the contemporaneous genera-
tion or by future generations.  Rather, well-trained lawyers and judges 
would simply decide what the most likely reading was; this practice was 
 
 25. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 16, at 774 (advocating narrow definitions of vague-
ness and ambiguity). 
 26. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles As the Core of 
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007).  
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legal interpretation, and the legal meanings generated by this practice, as 
part of original meaning, are still binding on us today.27  For similar rea-
sons, McGinnis and Rappaport reject my view that the use of standards 
and principles in a constitution delegates future construction to later 
generations.  If well-trained lawyers and judges in 1791 (or 1868) using 
the generally accepted methods of the era would have generated narrow-
er and more precise readings of the Constitution than we do today, those 
are the legal meanings—and hence the original public meanings—of this 
language.28 
I do not accept this model of original-meaning originalism for rea-
sons I describe at length in Living Originalism.  Some of my reasons are 
historical, and some are theoretical. 
First, relying on work by Larry Kramer, Caleb Nelson, and Saul 
Cornell,29 I argue that there was no consensus about the correct way to 
interpret the Constitution at the time of the Founding, in part because 
the idea of a federal constitution was so new, and analogies to trusts, 
treaties, contracts, and statutes pointed in very different directions.  
There were also disputes about the role of professional legal knowledge 
versus popular constitutional or plain meaning approaches.30  The very 
assumptions that McGinnis and Rappaport make about the primacy of 
lawyers’ interpretations in fixing constitutional meaning were hotly con-
tested at the Founding and were not resolved by ratification. 
Second and relatedly, original legal methods are not the same thing 
as original meanings; not everyone who ratified the Constitution was a 
lawyer, and not everyone who participated in the ratification debates as-
sumed that the Constitution should be interpreted according to lawyers’ 
views.  Some believed, to the contrary, that the Constitution belonged to 
the public as a whole, including and especially those untutored in law, 
and that “The People Themselves” would enforce the Constitution 
through politics.31 
Third, and perhaps most important, even if there was consensus 
about interpretive methods, it does not follow that to accept these meth-
ods we must also accept how lawyers in 1791 would have employed them.  
That is, we should not confuse original methods with the original applica-
tions of original methods.  For example, take a key Founding-era princi-
ple offered by McGinnis and Rappaport: when in doubt, we should 
 
 27. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 16, at 774–76 (arguing that vagueness and ambiguity 
is rare because judges are required to choose the most probable meaning). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See Saul Cornell, The People’s Constitution vs. The Lawyers’ Constitution: Popular Constitu-
tionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (2011); Larry Kra-
mer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 912–13 (2008); Caleb 
Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555–56, 561, 571–73 (2003). 
 30. See Cornell, supra note 29, at 304–20. 
 31. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–7 (2004). 
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choose the most probable meaning of abstract and vague language.32  We 
might employ the same principle today.  But the evidence we would look 
to and the reasons we would offer to settle on the most probable mean-
ing of a vague text like “freedom of speech” or “due process of law” to-
day might be very different than in 1791 because we have lived through 
220 more years of history and experience.  Bernadette Meyler has   
pointed out that the incorporation of common-law concepts and com-
mon-law terms into a constitution might also include a common-law pro-
cess of future development of those terms and concepts.33 
The differences between McGinnis and Rappaport and me are not 
primarily disputes about the philosophy of language.  Nor are they dis-
putes about the dictionary definitions of “original” or “meaning.”   
Rather, we disagree about how to cash out the idea of “original mean-
ing” in practice, and the most sensible way to read abstract language in 
an ancient constitution that we hope will endure for centuries.  Our disa-
greements, in short, are disagreements about how written constitutions 
work and what gives constitutions their contemporary democratic legiti-
macy.  These questions matter greatly in the case of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, which is not only one of the oldest written constitutions in the 
world, but is also one of the most difficult to amend.34  
“Meaning” is a capacious concept, and indeed, it has many different 
meanings, including semantic content, purposes, intentions, practical en-
tailments, and cultural associations.  Conceived most broadly, “meaning” 
includes a vast array of cultural associations, traditions, conventions, and 
background assumptions.  Any version of “original meaning” in legal in-
terpretation must inevitably carve out a subset of these cultural meanings 
and treat this portion as remaining in legal force over time.  Therefore, 
any version of “original meaning” will necessarily be anachronistic, be-
cause it will insert some portion of the vast array of past cultural mean-
ings into a contemporary setting without bringing the other parts along 
with it. 
Inevitably, then, we face a choice in the present about what aspects 
of cultural meaning should constitute “original meaning” for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation.  There is no natural and value-free way to 
make this selection.  It cannot be settled by the meaning of “meaning,” 
much less the meaning of “original.”  It is a choice that is informed by the 
purposes of a constitution and the promotion of the kind of legitimacy 
 
 32. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 15, at 773–75. 
 33. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 566–67, 
593–95, 600 (2006). 
 34. See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 261 tbl.11, 265–
67 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (noting that in comparison with other countries, “the U.S. Constitu-
tion is unusually, and probably excessively, difficult to amend,” and arguing that the strategies of judi-
cial revision are the likely consequence of such a constitution). 
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(democratic, social, procedural, or moral) we want our government to 
have. 
Movement conservatives first turned to original-meaning 
originalism in the 1980s to avoid difficulties with theories of original in-
tention and original understanding.  They argued that what binds con-
temporary interpreters should be original public meaning, not psycholog-
ical states and intentions.  In fact, the interpretation of a legal text always 
involves an ascription of purpose or intention to an author.  But the point 
is that this ascription of purpose or intention is invariably selective.  Peo-
ple identify some aspects of what the adopters sought, intended, as-
sumed, or desired as central to the goals of interpretation—that is, the 
interpretive enterprise they are currently engaged in—and treat other 
aspects as optional or even as irrelevant.  When we engage in interpreta-
tion, we do not seek fidelity to all aspects of an author’s intentions or 
meanings.  Rather, we seek fidelity to the relevant aspects of intentions 
or meanings, given how we understand the nature and purpose of the in-
terpretive practice we are engaged in.  Our practices of interpretation are 
therefore always anachronistic and selective because we are interpreting 
for a (present-day) purpose. 
In Living Originalism, I focus on original semantic meaning (includ-
ing generally recognized terms of art) and the adopters’ choice of basic 
technologies of linguistic constraint: rules, standards, principles, and si-
lences.  The remaining aspects of cultural meaning I treat as resources for 
construction, but not as part of the framework.  
Why do I do this?  My (selective) account of original meaning flows 
from my view about how written constitutions work over long periods of 
time and what makes them legitimate for generations long after their 
adoption. 
Constitutions are basic plans for politics that have to be carried out 
over time by many different generations, who may not share the 
adopters’ cultural presuppositions and worldview.  Not everything can be 
settled at the outset; therefore adopters must put their trust in later gen-
erations to carry out the plan and adapt it to new circumstances.  That is, 
adopters need the contributions of later generations to keep the plan go-
ing.  Later generations are not simply slavish followers of the adopters’ 
will; they have a crucial role to play in building out the plan and helping 
it succeed.  The intelligence and creativity of later generations is just as 
important to the success of the plan over time as the initial insight of the 
adopters.  Constitutions simultaneously constrain and enable political ac-
tion by participants.  But no constitution can be designed that is so per-
fect that it will succeed without the judgment and wisdom of later gener-
ations. 
Adopters, recognizing this, choose different technologies of con-
straint based on how they wish to constrain or enable future generations.  
To use Scott Shapiro’s phrase, plans for politics involve an “economy of 
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trust” (and distrust).35  To understand the contributions that different 
generations make to the plan, we must understand this economy.  There-
fore, if we accept the adopters’ plan as our plan and wish to carry it for-
ward into the future, the adopters’ choice of rules, standards, principles, 
and silences should matter to us.  
Rules minimize practical judgment by later generations; standards 
and principles channel judgment but also require it.  Silences leave mat-
ters to be determined later on.  For this reason, we should take seriously 
the use of abstract or vague language in a constitution, especially when 
adopters could have used more precise language or could have specified 
a historical standard—for example, they might have protected “freedom 
of speech as understood at the time of adoption of this Constitution.” 
My account of original meaning assumes that adopters recognize 
that a great deal will have to be worked out through construction and 
that their choice of rules, standards, and principles is deliberate.  It as-
cribes this understanding and these purposes to the adopters.  They are 
creating a constitution not only for their time, but for a later time they 
cannot know much about. 
This economy of freedom and constraint, trust and distrust is im-
portant for a second reason.  The democratic legitimacy of the Constitu-
tion is not established at the moment of adoption.  Rather, it derives 
from multiple sources.  The first source of democratic legitimacy is the 
act of adoption or amendment.  The second arises from the processes of 
constitutional construction over time.  Constitutions cannot maintain 
their democratic legitimacy without contributions from multiple genera-
tions.  For the Constitution to have democratic legitimacy in each gener-
ation it must succeed as “our law”: people must understand it as their ac-
complishment and as something that belongs to them.  We make the 
Constitution “our law” by struggling over its meaning in constitutional 
politics, producing new constitutional constructions, and building on or 
revising older ones.  Framework originalism argues that fidelity to the 
basic framework creates a space for constitutional construction, and that 
the framework allows—and requires—each generation to do its part in 
making the Constitution its own Constitution. 
For many conservative originalists, my account of original meaning 
is too barebones, and my theory of framework originalism leaves too 
much to be built out later on.  Nevertheless, conservative originalists 
must also make a choice about what aspects of cultural meaning to carry 
forward from past to present as binding on us today, what economy of 
trust and distrust to ascribe to the Constitution, and what degree of 
anachronism to accept.  Their choice in these matters cannot simply be 
one of definitional requirement; it does not flow from the meaning of 
“original meaning.”  Whether consciously or not, their choice must be 
 
 35. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 331–52 (2011). 
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based on background assumptions about the purposes of a constitution, 
and how its legitimacy is maintained over time. 
These considerations apply equally to McGinnis and Rappaport’s 
theory of original legal methods.  Although McGinnis and Rappaport 
urge lawyers to stick to the ordinary work of legal argument, their ver-
sion of originalism is nevertheless backed by a distinctive constitutional 
and political theory. 
What is that theory?  They argue that originalism is the best theory 
of interpretation because it is likely to produce the best consequences 
over time.36  Originalism produces the best consequences because the 
1787 Constitution was adopted by a supermajority vote—nine of thirteen 
state conventions had to adopt the Constitution to ratify it—and because 
ever since then, amendments under Article V have required two-thirds 
votes of both houses of Congress and ratification by three-quarters of the 
state legislatures. 
Supermajority ratification rules produce rules with superior conse-
quences because adopters are naturally risk averse.37  They will not vote 
to ratify a constitution or a constitutional amendment unless they are 
quite sure that the constitution or the amendment will produce good re-
sults in the future, as it will be difficult to change the provision later on.  
Moreover, adopters vote for laws that will affect their descendants in 
very different situations, so there is a sort of temporal “veil of ignorance” 
that leads them to choose optimal rules that will benefit future inhabi-
tants even if adopters do not know what conditions will obtain later on.38 
 
 36. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1693, 1695 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 1735; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 774–75 (“Even in the rare instances 
where groups disagree and nevertheless would like a provision to be put in the Constitution, a delega-
tion to the future would not represent a likely rational compromise because it would increase risks for 
everyone involved.”). 
 38. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 1697, 1702, 1708; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra 
note 10 at 779 (noting that veil of ignorance also helps to protect minority rights). 
The central role that supermajority rules play in McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory of 
originalism leads to a number of puzzles.  If a three-quarters majority of states makes for better rules 
than a simple majority, why not require unanimity, as John Rawls does in his original position?  In 
fact, the Articles of Confederation actually required unanimity for both adoption and amendment.  
Does this mean that its rules were ex ante more likely to be optimal than the procedures used to adopt 
the 1787 Constitution? 
Presumably, McGinnis and Rappaport would agree that there is a “sweet spot” for supermajor-
ity rules: just enough difficulty to force optimal content, but not so much that the threat of holdouts 
wrecks the process or forces morally undesirable compromises—for example, rules protecting slavery.  
Because McGinnis and Rappaport do not focus on this particular question, however, they do not tell 
us how this sweet spot is properly measured or whether it might change over time.  Perhaps equally 
important, given the many different kinds of supermajority rules that might have been chosen, they 
also do not explain why the Framers of the U.S. Constitution miraculously happened upon just the 
right balance in 1787 and why this optimal balance continues two centuries later. 
In fact, there is reason to doubt that the adopters succeeded in picking supermajority rules best 
calculated to produce good consequences over time.  The U.S. Constitution is among the most difficult 
to amend of any constitution in the world; if its procedures are optimal, this would suggest that the rest 
of the world’s constitutions—and those of the fifty states—are suboptimal.  More likely, given the ex-
perience of subsequent history, the U.S. Constitution is well beyond the magical sweet spot for optimal 
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In order to enjoy the benefits of supermajority ratification proce-
dures, it is important that constitutional provisions be relatively clear and 
determinate; first, so that people can know in advance what they are vot-
ing for; and second, so that later generations cannot vary them, except 
through subsequent amendments that require supermajority support. 
Although in theory adopters could delegate to future generations 
the role of working out the details later on—which is the central assump-
tion of framework originalism—McGinnis and Rappaport believe that it 
is very unlikely they would do so because rational adopters are risk 
averse.39  Rational adopters would not vote for provisions that are vague 
and abstract because they would not know how these provisions will be 
applied in the future.  Moreover, delegation to future generations would 
not appeal to risk averse adopters because constructions by judges and 
the political branches will not be disciplined by supermajority proce-
dures, and so their work will likely be inferior to that of adopters con-
strained by supermajority rules. 
In particular, McGinnis and Rappaport believe that risk averse 
adopters would clearly reject the idea of “judicial updating” by unelected 
judges.40  Judges do not even represent majorities; therefore there is no 
reason to think that the constructions they produce would have good 
consequences.  Viewed from an ex ante perspective, the legal meaning of 
“equal protection” in 1868 is likely to be superior to anything the Warren 
Court or Congress in the 1960s could come up with.  Similarly, the law-
yerly consensus about the meaning of the First Amendment in 1791 is 
likely to be superior to judicial development of free speech jurisprudence 
a century and a half later, because the former required supermajority 
consent, and the latter required only five votes on the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
 
content.  It is probably far too difficult to amend, which means that its rules are likely to be subopti-
mal.  Equally likely, its amendment procedures are likely to lead to compromises that kick difficult 
and contentious issues down the road for others to solve.  This is precisely what McGinnis and Rap-
paport deny. 
Moreover, the methods for adoption and amendment of the U.S. Constitution have varied.  The 
1787 Constitution was adopted by simple majority votes of three-quarters of state ratifying conven-
tions, while subsequent amendments have been adopted by two-thirds vote of Congress plus three-
quarters of the states (which, except for Nebraska, has generally required ratification by two houses of 
the state legislature).  Thus, the rules for amendment are considerably more onerous than the rules for 
initial ratification.  Does this mean that rules appearing in the 1787 Constitution are ex ante more like-
ly to be inferior to those in the Bill of Rights, or vice versa?  Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was adopted by a rump Congress—Republicans refused to seat returning southern congressmen and 
senators—and southern states were not readmitted until they agreed to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Does this mean that judged ex ante the content of the Fourteenth Amendment is likely 
to be inferior to the content of the 1787 Constitution? 
 39. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 1735; John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, 
The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rules, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 67, 94, 112 (2008).  
 40. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 1737–43; McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 
771–74; see also McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 16, at 775–76 (arguing that rational adopters 
would require resolution of ambiguity and vagueness to prevent discretion to future interpreters). 
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Moreover, McGinnis and Rappaport’s point is that supermajority 
procedures that produce better consequences in 1791 will continue to 
provide these benefits in 2012, because supermajority rules force 
adopters to adopt rules that will be optimal for the future, and if this 
proves not to be the case, a contemporary supermajority can use an Arti-
cle V amendment to make corrections.  Judicial “updating” by contem-
porary judges, by contrast, loses the discipline—and therefore the bene-
fits—of supermajority procedures.41 
Accordingly, McGinnis and Rappaport do not believe that the ex-
istence of vague or abstract principles in the Constitution delegates to fu-
ture generations the job of engaging in constitutional construction.  In-
stead, they believe that supermajority provisions produce “determinate 
principles about which there is a broad consensus”42 at the time of ratifi-
cation.  They argue that political or social groups would rarely agree to 
place provisions in a constitution when there is significant disagreement 
about their content.  Doing so is simply not rational, because “[t]here is 
an alternative when groups cannot agree: leave out controversial princi-
ples and entrench only consensus ones.”43  It follows that the consensus 
view as of 1787 (or 1791 or 1868) is what matters for interpretation, be-
cause that is what opposed groups will converge on—otherwise the pro-
vision would not even make it into the Constitution—and this consensus 
view is likely to produce the best results not only for the current genera-
tion, but for future generations as well. 
Now we can understand why McGinnis and Rappaport believe that 
what they call “legal meaning” must be part of original meaning.  Their 
background theory of supermajority rules explains and justifies their 
choices about what aspects of the past count as “original meaning.”  
What makes a constitution valuable for them is its ability to generate 
good consequences over time.  Rules created by supermajorities must be 
relatively determinate because only relatively determinate rules can be 
assured of producing good consequences; vague and abstract texts will be 
too easy for later generations (and later judges) to shirk, thus debilitating 
the Constitution’s beneficial effects.  Because adopters are rational and 
would seek to achieve good consequences over time, we must presume 
that they are risk averse and that they will agree only to relatively deter-
minate rules. 
Although some constitutional language may seem abstract or vague 
to us today, this is an illusion.  The language was not unclear or vague to 
risk averse adopters because they relied on the interpretations of well-
trained lawyers at the time of ratification, as well as the canon that when 
language is vague or unclear we should always choose the interpretation 
that was most likely the one intended. 
 
 41. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 1722–23, 1737–48. 
 42. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 772. 
 43. Id. at 774. 
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McGinnis and Rappaport, in short, argue that the Constitution’s le-
gitimacy comes from the fact that supermajority rules have produced a 
“good Constitution” in which ordinary politics can operate.44  Ordinary 
politics, however, cannot change the Constitution’s legal meaning; nor 
can “judicial updating” that is responsive to politics.  Legitimate constitu-
tional development can only occur through supermajority procedures 
that are calculated to produce superior results. 
This model of originalism is a species of “skyscraper originalism.”45  
Skyscraper originalism sees the Constitution as a more or less finished 
project for democratic politics, although it is always subject to later Arti-
cle V amendment.  The Constitution provides a space in which democrat-
ic politics occurs.  Democratic lawmaking within this space, however, is 
not constitutional construction.  It is ordinary law that is constitutionally 
permissible given the boundaries of the Constitution as adopted.  It can-
not change the Constitution, any more than everyday activity within a 
building can change the building’s structure.  Thus, no matter how much 
social mobilizations like the civil rights movement or the women’s 
movement may have affected American political culture, they cannot le-
gitimately change the meaning of the Constitution except through Arti-
cle V amendment. 
I do not accept this account of constitutional language for two rea-
sons.  First, I do not agree that because adopters are risk averse, they will 
use general or abstract language to articulate relatively concrete and con-
sensus commitments.  Especially where fundamental rights are con-
cerned, constitutional adopters use vague and abstract language because 
they want to state basic commitments that they expect others to carry out 
in the future.  They wish to channel and guide politics by placing basic 
values in the Constitution so that people can refer to them in subsequent 
political struggles.  Written declarations of rights, even if phrased in ab-
stract language, shape political struggles, and this, in turn, affects the law 
that is produced by politics. 
James Madison offered a similar explanation when he introduced 
the initial draft of the Bill of Rights before Congress.  Previously in the 
Federalist Papers, and in correspondence with Thomas Jefferson, Madi-
son suggested that bills of rights were mere “parchment barriers” that 
might have little effect.46  Declarations of vague and abstract rights would 
be easy to manipulate and would offer little protection against a deter-
mined majority.  In his address to the First Congress Madison repeated 
this concern, but ascribed it to others: “It may be thought that all paper 
barriers against the power of the community are too weak to be worthy 
 
 44. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 1720–22. 
 45. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 21–23. 
 46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888); Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 
269, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) (“Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been com-
mitted by overbearing majorities in every State.”). 
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of attention.  I am sensible they are not so strong as to satisfy gentlemen 
of every description who have seen and examined thoroughly the texture 
of such a defence.”47   
Despite this objection, Madison argued, written declarations of 
rights “have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for them, to 
establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the 
whole community.”48  These social and cultural effects “may be one 
means to control the majority from those acts to which they might be 
otherwise inclined.”49  Similarly, in his correspondence with Jefferson, 
Madison noted that stating basic rights in a constitution might have a sal-
utary influence on political culture: “The political truths declared in that 
solemn manner acquire by degrees the character of fundamental maxims 
of free Government, and as they become incorporated with the national 
sentiment, counteract the impulses of interest and passion.”50  
Madison surely understood, as we do today, that abstract rights lan-
guage invites multiple and contrasting interpretations among constitu-
tional adopters.  But using more concrete language might undermine the 
possibility of agreement, or it might lead to narrow protections of specific 
examples of a freedom that become irrelevant as time passes.  Using ab-
stract and vague language naturally produces disputes about the true 
meaning of rights guarantees as new policy questions emerge.  It thrusts 
discussion of constitutional rights into politics; in doing so, it begins the 
processes of constitutional construction that actually protect these rights 
in practice. 
The First Amendment provides a good example.  When the First 
Amendment was adopted in 1791, the standard legal view—the legal 
meaning, in McGinnis and Rappaport’s terms—was that the guarantee of 
freedom of the press banned prior restraints on publication but did not 
prevent subsequent punishments for libel or seditious advocacy.51  Never-
theless, the actual practices of freedom of expression during the period 
leading up to the adoption of the Bill of Rights were considerably more 
libertarian, and developing ideas of popular sovereignty—in contrast to 
parliamentary sovereignty—made it crucial for ordinary individuals to be 
able to criticize their government.  In fact, as Akhil Amar points out, the 
 
 47. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 46, at 273. 
 51. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52.  As Blackstone explained: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying 
no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter 
when published.  Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is im-
proper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. 
Id. (emphasis omitted).  Leonard Levy famously argued that this limited, Blackstonian interpretation 
was the official legal meaning of free expression at the time of the Founding, while acknowledging the 
views of critics that the “law in action” was considerably freer.  See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE 
OF A FREE PRESS (1985). 
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very process of ratifying the Constitution required that ordinary citizens 
be able to criticize government officials and the existing form of govern-
ment—the Articles of Confederation.52 
The dispute over the Sedition Act of 1798 brought the traditional 
lawyer’s reading—defended by the dominant Federalist Party—into con-
flict with the views of an emerging political mobilization, the Jeffersonian 
Republican Party, which argued for a broader legal conception of free 
expression.  Jeffersonians had criticized the government for its approach 
in the developing conflict with France.  They thought Blackstone’s doc-
trine, in James Madison’s words, to be a “mockery” of free speech.53  
Nevertheless, Federalist judges, relying on traditional concepts of free 
expression, shut down five of the six most influential Republican pa-
pers.54 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s original legal methods approach argues 
that the legal meaning of the First Amendment today should rest on “de-
terminate principles about which there is a broad consensus”55 in 1791.  
The problem is that there was no broad consensus for the Republican 
position in 1791, and certainly not in 1798: the two parties were at each 
other’s throats over this very issue.  Given that the Federalists dominated 
national politics in 1791 when the amendment was adopted, the broad 
consensus required by McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory would have to 
give strong weight to their position.  A demand for consensus about 
rights provisions in 1791 would seem to suggest a lowest-common de-
nominator approach, something closer to Blackstone’s view.56  Because 
 
 52. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012). 
 53. James Madison, Report on the Resolutions (Feb. 7, 1799), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 341, 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
 54. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 575 (2004); Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Orig-
inal Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 459–60 (1987).  On Federal-
ist prosecutions of Republican speech, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN 
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 256–270 (1966).  The Federalist report on the 
bill in the House of Representatives likewise insisted that there was nothing unconstitutional about the 
proposed bill.  It argued that the Sedition Act was consistent with the First Amendment because it did 
not impose a prior restraint, because it was merely declaratory of the common law (in fact, it was more 
speech protective than the common law because it allowed a defense of truth), and because states with 
free speech and press guarantees in their constitutions already punished seditious and malicious publi-
cations.  See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 2988–90 (1799). 
John Marshall, who by the late 1790s was one of the Federalist Party’s leading figures, believed 
that the Sedition Act was bad policy and unwise; nevertheless, he defended its constitutionality in an 
anonymous report for the Virginia Legislature that responded to Madison’s famous report.  See JOHN 
MARSHALL, REPORT OF THE MINORITY ON THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS (1798), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 136–39 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (attributed to Mar-
shall); Kurt T. Lash & Alicia Harrison, Minority Report: John Marshall and the Defense of the Alien 
and Sedition Acts, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (2007) (describing Marshall’s participation in the Sedition Act 
controversy). 
 55. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 772. 
 56. Indeed, this interpretation would satisfy two important criteria of McGinnis and Rappaport’s 
theory of original legal methods.  It would have been the most likely meaning that would have gener-
ated a broad determinate consensus among both Federalists and their opponents, and it would have 
been the legal meaning that assumed the constitutionality of the relevant legislation and left disputes 
up to the political branches to resolve.  See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 16, at 775. 
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McGinnis and Rappaport appear to treat the Sedition Act as an 
antiprecedent, rather than as an honored source of original legal mean-
ing,57 this is probably not what they had in mind.  Yet, I must confess 
that, given this example, I am not sure how to operationalize their theory 
of determinate principles that enjoy broad consensus at the time of adop-
tion.  In fact, it is very unlikely that even the outer boundaries of the con-
sensus on freedom of expression in 1791 would be consistent with our 
modern conceptions of free speech, free press, and freedom of associa-
tion.  If McGinnis and Rappaport are really serious about deriving origi-
nal meaning in the way they say they are, they have a lot of explaining to 
do if they wish to justify modern civil rights and civil liberties protections.  
It is worth noting that, like many conservative originalists, McGinnis and 
Rappaport have had to devise an elaborate theory of nonoriginalist  
precedent to make their theory compatible with the modern state.58  
Because I do not share McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory, I draw a 
very different conclusion from this evidence.  The abstract language of 
the First Amendment left unresolved differing views about the meaning 
of freedom of speech and press; these disputes would break out into the 
open later on in the 1790s, just as unresolved disputes about the scope of 
federal power would lead to political struggles over a national bank.  Po-
sitions on free speech divided along party lines because they were 
wrapped up in the French foreign policy crisis, leading the Jeffersonians 
to champion libertarian ideas that were connected to the right of the 
people, as popular sovereigns, to criticize their elected representatives.  
The same crisis, it should be noted, also led Jefferson to offer creative 
views about state interposition that are out of the mainstream today. 
Here we can see Madison’s point about the Bill of Rights in prac-
tice: having a text in the Constitution that guaranteed the freedoms of 
speech, press, and petition created additional respect for these principles 
in politics.  It gave Republicans something to rally around in their dis-
pute with the Federalists, even if the Jeffersonian position on free speech 
was controversial.  The Republican victory in 1800 and the Jeffersonian 
revolution led to new constructions of the First Amendment that were 
confirmed by executive and legislative practices, including Jefferson’s 
pardon of persons convicted under the Sedition Act. 
The fight over the Sedition Act is the beginning of the processes of 
constitutional construction that we know as living constitutionalism.  
When the Supreme Court decided New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964, it 
looked to the later Jeffersonian construction of free speech, and not to 
the views of Federalist lawyers in 1791, as the appropriate resource for 
 
 57. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 10, at 767 n.123. 
 58. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009). 
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constitutional construction.59  At the same time, the Warren Court did 
not accept the Jeffersonian theory of interposition, a theory seized on by 
Southern critics of Brown v. Board of Education.60 
The Sedition Act controversy shows how constitutional construction 
grows naturally out of ordinary politics.  Political controversies of the 
moment lead to disputes about vague or abstract constitutional language; 
the resolution of these disputes becomes part of the Constitution-in-
practice, and a new set of resources for future generations in future con-
troversies. 
My second objection to McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory of consti-
tutional language flows from the first.  McGinnis and Rappaport’s theory 
argues that rational constitutional adopters are risk averse; therefore 
seemingly abstract or vague language must refer to a relatively determi-
nate consensus position at the time of adoption.  There is a natural ex-
periment to test this claim.  Many countries have adopted constitutions 
following World War II that have abstract rights guarantees.  The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the South African Constitution 
are two prominent examples, but there are many others.61  If constitu-
tional adopters are naturally risk averse and want their constitutions to 
deliver the best consequences, we should expect to see widespread adop-
tion of something like original-methods originalism around the world.  In 
fact the opposite is the case, even in the United States.  Among the na-
tions of the world, American political culture is perhaps the most focused 
on originalism, but devotion to the Framers’ wishes is honored more in 
the breach than the observance.  Originalist conclusions are often reject-
ed in practice, and American courts do not regularly employ anything 
like McGinnis and Rappaport’s original-methods originalism to resolve 
most constitutional controversies.   
Moreover, American ideas of originalism are not widely adopted 
outside the United States (although a few constitutional cultures employ 
originalist arguments in conjunction with other modalities).62  Looking 
 
 59. 376 U.S. 254, 274–77 (1964) (arguing that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in 
this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history” and citing Jefferson’s 
and Madison’s views with approval). 
 60. 347 U.S. 483 (1953); see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN 
POLITICS 58–60 (2000) (describing the role of James J. Kilpatrick and the Richmond News Leader in 
creating a theory to justify Southern resistance to Brown); Joseph J. Thorndike, “The Sometimes Sor-
did Level of Race and Segregation”: James J. Kilpatrick and the Virginia Campaign Against Brown, in 
THE MODERATES’ DILEMMA: MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN VIRGINIA 51, 
51–71 (Matthew D. Lassiter & Andrew B. Lewis eds., 1998) (describing the evolution of interposition 
arguments as justifications for resistance to Brown). 
 61. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.); S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
 62. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Par-
adoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 633, 656, 656 n.83 (2004) (“In Europe . . . recourse to 
originalism is virtually nonexistent” and “even implicit references to originalism in substance are quite 
rare.”).  David Fontana points out that originalist arguments or originalist rhetoric may sometimes 
appear in other countries, especially in those with a revolutionary tradition.  See David Fontana, Re-
sponse, Comparative Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 189, 189–90 (2010).  But Fontana does not argue 
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immediately to the north, there is no reason to think that Canadians are 
especially more daring or risk-loving when it comes to constitutions than 
Americans; yet Canada is famous for its “living tree” doctrine and, as  
Peter Hogg has put it succinctly, “Originalism has never enjoyed any sig-
nificant support in Canada.”63  Yet if McGinnis and Rappaport are cor-
rect about what rational adopters would demand for their constitutions, 
Canada should be just as much a hotbed of originalism as the United 
States. 
In fact, scholars and jurists in other countries are often puzzled by 
the American debate over originalism and America’s originalist obses-
sions.  They do not understand why vague and abstract language requires 
originalist methods.  The dominant strategy for dealing with vague and 
abstract language in constitutions around the world is proportionality re-
view, and not original-methods originalism.64  It is possible that—and cer-
tainly many American politicians would like us to believe that—
everyone else around the world is simply crazy, but perhaps there is a 
more charitable explanation. 
The reason why a constitutional culture finds originalism attractive 
probably has little to do either with rationality or risk aversion.  David 
Fontana has suggested that originalist rhetoric is most likely to appear in 
countries with a revolutionary tradition in which a constitution is strongly 
identified with the creation of the nation itself.65  Ozan Varol, in his study 
of the secularism provisions of the Turkish Constitution, has suggested 
that “originalism blossoms when a political leader associated with the 
creation or revision of the nation’s constitution develops a cult of per-
sonality within the nation.”66  More generally, it seems reasonable to 
think that a predilection for originalism stems from features of cultural 
memory characteristic of a particular political tradition, and does not fol-
low from theories of language or rational choice. 
Perhaps only “real Americans” possess the risk aversion that 
McGinnis and Rappaport insist is shared by all rational constitutional 
 
that any country—including the United States—has adopted something like McGinnis and Rap-
paport’s model of original methods originalism.  See id. 
 63. See Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING 
CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 83 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
 64. See Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights Review 
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 799 (2011) (“[C]onstitutional courts in legal systems 
around the world have converged on a method for adjudicating rights claims—proportionality analy-
sis . . . .”). 
 65. Fontana, supra note 62, at 190 (arguing that “the most relevant” factor explaining a country’s 
view on originalism “is whether or not its constitution created the nation that lives under the constitu-
tion, or whether the constitution merely reorganized the institutions of the country but did not create 
the nation that lives under the constitution”). 
 66. Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1246 (2011).  If Varol and Fontana are correct, then originalism would not de-
velop in revolutionary traditions like France, first because the French nation predated the French 
Revolution and the creation of the First Republic, and second, because the French Revolution itself, 
and not individual revolutionaries like Robespierre, is the object of civic devotion. 
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adopters.  But there is a natural experiment even here.  There are fifty 
American state constitutions, and they are constantly being updated and 
rewritten.67  If McGinnis and Rappaport are correct, original-methods 
originalism, because it produces the best consequences, should have be-
come the standard method of interpretation for state constitutions as 
well as the federal constitution, because risk averse adopters would de-
mand it.  But this does not seem to have occurred.  Although state su-
preme courts, like federal courts, often make originalist arguments, they 
do not seem to be rigorously originalist in the way that McGinnis and 
Rappaport demand.68  Indeed, state courts often seem to outdo federal 
courts in their embrace of living constitutionalism,69 or as McGinnis and 
Rappaport call it, “judicial updating.”  For example, many living consti-
tutionalist claims about race relations, sex equality, and gay rights have 
originated in state courts before gradually being accepted by federal 
courts.  The practice of state courts makes perfect sense in my model of 
how living constitutionalism operates.  Mobilizations and countermobi-
lizations naturally turn first to local venues to win converts, and many of 
the most important transformations in constitutional doctrine have oc-
curred first in the state courts.  But these practices are not consistent with 
McGinnis and Rappaport’s account. 
Of course, what courts do is not necessarily the same thing as what 
rational adopters expect or demand.  It is theoretically possible that 
courts around the world—and in the several states—have repeatedly and 
systematically acted in defiance of risk averse adopters.  Adopters re-
peatedly insist on original-methods originalism, and the courts repeated-
ly ignore them.  One would think that adopters, being both rational and 
risk averse, would eventually have figured this out by watching what 
happened in other jurisdictions, and would stop using such vague and ab-
stract language, or else require constitutions to include qualifiers such as 
“as understood at the time of adoption.”  Apparently, however, they 
never learn. 
A more parsimonious explanation, however, is that constitutional 
adopters are not risk averse in the way that McGinnis and Rappaport 
imagine they are, and that they adopt vague and abstract language for 
reasons that are closer to the ones I offer: people use vague and abstract 
language in constitutions to state general commitments that they hope 
 
 67. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS 
OF GOVERNANCE 331–35 (2012) (describing the frequency of amendment and the multiple constitu-
tions that have existed in the various states). 
 68. See, e.g., Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of 
Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1485 (2010) (noting that 
state constitutional courts generally dispense with elaborate canons of construction and that state uses 
of originalist argument may be quite different from those found in federal courts). 
 69. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same-sex mar-
riage); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (same). 
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will guide and channel future politics but whose precise contours will 
have to be worked out by others over time. 
III. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESSUALISM 
Living Originalism argues that the processes of living constitutional-
ism that have developed in the United States contribute to democratic 
legitimacy over long periods of time.  Fidelity and legitimacy, however, 
are distinct concepts, and neither guarantees the other.  Moreover, as 
Mariah Zeisberg’s article points out, neither concept is identical with po-
litical success or political dominance.70  In fact, political success can un-
dermine a constitution’s democratic functioning and democratic legiti-
macy. 
Fidelity means adherence to a plan for politics.  Fidelity concerns 
(1) whether people are following the plan and (2) whether they are trying 
to work out the details of the plan in a way that best furthers the plan 
and its goals.  One can speak of fidelity to the entire plan or fidelity to 
various aspects of the plan—for example, fidelity to the guarantee of the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Participants in the constitutional system will often disagree about 
constitutional fidelity, especially as it relates to constitutional construc-
tion by the political branches and by the judiciary.  Especially where is-
sues of state-building construction are concerned (for example, how to 
construct cabinet departments or create institutions that deliver social 
services), a wide variety of constructions might be faithful to the plan.  
Nevertheless, participants will argue that some constructions are more 
faithful to the Constitution than others.  Libertarians might argue that 
the creation of the modern post-New Deal state is less faithful to the con-
stitutional plan than many pre-New Deal constructions; conservatives 
might insist that cases like Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas are not 
faithful interpretations but that robust presidential war powers are faith-
ful to the plan; liberals might disagree, and so on.  Fidelity is a judgment 
made within the constitutional system by the participants; it is often a 
comparative judgment (more or less faithful), and it is often highly con-
troversial. 
As a participant in the system, I have my own views on what con-
structions are most faithful to original meaning and underlying princi-
ples, and I articulate some of them in Living Originalism.  In some cases, 
my views are mainstream, in others I am a constitutional dissenter.  
Moreover, people employing similar methods to mine may reach differ-
ent conclusions; for example, Randy Barnett and I disagree about the 
proper interpretation and construction of national power. 
 
 70. Mariah Zeisberg, The Politics of Constitutional Fidelity, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 801, 804–07. 
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In contrast to fidelity, legitimacy is not a property of individual con-
structions or interpretations but rather of the constitutional and political 
system as a whole.  Legitimacy concerns whether the constitutional and 
political system is sufficiently worthy of respect by its participants, that it 
is reasonable for them to consent to the state’s power over them and 
others.  If the system is not sufficiently worthy of respect at present, then 
legitimacy requires faith that it will eventually become so.  
Legitimacy has several dimensions.  Sociological legitimacy con-
cerns the extent to which people accept the system as having the right 
and the authority to rule them.  Procedural (or legal) legitimacy concerns 
the extent to which people clothed with state power (including, for ex-
ample, government officials, jurors, and voters) make decisions accord-
ing to official legal rules and procedures.  Moral legitimacy concerns the 
extent to which the system is just or morally admirable, for example, be-
cause it protects human rights and makes just decisions about matters of 
social welfare and foreign policy. 
Living Originalism is primarily concerned with democratic legitima-
cy.  A system is democratically legitimate to the extent that it allows the 
members of the political community to govern themselves and makes 
government action accountable to public will, public values, and public 
opinion.  Democratic legitimacy draws on aspects of the three other 
forms of legitimacy, although it is not identical with any of them.  For ex-
ample, democratic legitimacy may require that the state treat the mem-
bers of the relevant political community as equal citizens or with equal 
and appropriate respect, which, in turn, will require the protection of 
basic human rights and regular legal procedures. 
The Constitution and its amendments are acts of popular sovereign-
ty that create a basic plan for a democratic politics that must be filled out 
over time.  Constitutional construction is either directly produced by the 
political branches (through state building constructions) or is in the long 
run responsive to them because of institutional constraints on the federal 
judiciary.  Thus, popular sovereignty is exercised directly through the 
creation of the constitutional framework (including amendments) and 
either directly or indirectly through constitutional construction.  The 
processes of living constitutionalism are consistent with and promote 
democratic legitimacy in the medium to long run because they allow po-
litical and social mobilizations to change the Constitution-in-practice 
through constitutional construction as well as constitutional amendment. 
The American model of constitutional development evolved over a 
long period of time, partly by design but mostly through successive polit-
ical struggles.  It does not guarantee justice or good outcomes.  Indeed, it 
may produce very unjust results.  That is one reason that constitutional 
faith is required by constitutional dissenters who see its defects all too 
clearly. 
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Although I believe that the system of living constitutionalism pro-
motes democratic legitimacy, it does not guarantee it.  The system has 
many flaws, and depending on one’s substantive conception of democra-
cy, its flaws may be quite significant.  Moreover, there is no guarantee 
that people working within the system will not, over time, make it less 
democratically responsive. 
This is Zeisberg’s point: the mere fact that certain constitutional 
constructions succeed in winning widespread public acceptance or public 
support does not mean that they are the most faithful constructions or 
that they make the constitutional system democratically legitimate.  Po-
litical success is not the same thing as constitutional fidelity.  It is also not 
the same thing as democratic legitimacy. 
The first point should be obvious.  Political success produced the 
Jim Crow Republic following the 1896 election.  A series of constitution-
al constructions rationalized racial apartheid in the United States, and 
the constructions, in turn, were supported by powerful political elites and 
either accepted or actively pursued by key players in the two major polit-
ical parties.  Jim Crow was a political success; it lasted for seventy years.  
But this does not make it the most faithful interpretation of the Constitu-
tion.  Perhaps many people at the time thought that it was, but many 
constitutional dissenters disagreed.  For them, the Constitution was being 
betrayed. 
Even a democratically responsive Constitution-in-practice does not 
guarantee that people will further the constitutional plan in the way that 
best serves moral legitimacy or democratic legitimacy.  A democratically 
responsive constitution can lead to antidemocratic practices, to great 
evils, or degrade into a tyranny or a dictatorship.  Indeed, this is precisely 
why the Framers feared democracy in its simplest form. 
The second point may seem more counterintuitive, but Zeisberg’s 
basic claim seems correct.  Political success does not by itself guarantee 
democratic legitimacy if certain features of constitutional development 
undermine democratic legitimacy.  For example, the Senate’s rules have 
evolved so that the filibuster is invoked on even routine legislation.  This 
is the result of successful politics, but, in my view, it undermines demo-
cratic responsiveness.  The Jim Crow Republic may have been estab-
lished and reinforced by multiple electoral victories, but I believe it vio-
lated a key precept of democratic legitimacy: that the state must treat all 
of the members of the political community as equal citizens and with the 
equal respect that comes with that status.  In our own day, perceived 
threats to national security have led the political branches to create an 
ever more powerful presidency with proliferating institutions and budg-
ets that are shrouded in secrecy, and that are increasingly difficult to sub-
ject to either democratic or judicial scrutiny. 
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The famous Carolene Products footnote71 and John Hart Ely’s theo-
ry of judicial review72 are premised on the idea that some constitutional 
constructions better serve the goals of democratic legitimacy than others, 
and that some constitutional developments can cripple democracy or 
cumulatively undermine self-government. 
Zeisberg generalizes this familiar structural idea.  She argues that 
we should judge actors within a constitutional system by how well they 
employ—and build out—their institutional capacities to further the pur-
poses of their particular institution in the larger system of constitutional 
democracy.  She calls this the criterion of democratic “processualism.”73  
Nevertheless, Zeisberg recognizes, the idea of processualism faces 
an endemic problem.  Perhaps the different branches of government 
have a duty to stay true to the constitutional values that define their 
proper role in the larger system.  But institutions are not always the best 
judges of their proper capacities and responsibilities.  Zeisberg argues 
that the political branches have a duty of “institutional reflexity”: “The 
branches are charged with, at a minimum, maintaining their own capaci-
ties to govern in ways that are disciplined by their animating constitu-
tional functions.”74  The difficulty is that although political actors should 
be self-reflective, their self-analysis is often skewed in their own favor.  
For example, the more they succeed in political struggles, they more they 
will tend to assume that they are helping the entire system work better as 
well.  Conversely, when they lose in particular political struggles, they 
tend to see their failure as due to the failure of opposing institutions to 
behave according to their proper role.  Disputes between the President 
and Congress, or between federal courts and state political officials, are 
familiar examples. 
We may want the President continually to inquire whether the con-
struction of the National Surveillance State75 is the best way to harness 
the presidency’s distinctive capacities and obligations to democracy.  But 
the President is likely to think that protecting the country from harm is 
not only one of his primary duties, but an obligation that he will be 
judged most harshly for if he fails.  In the long run, therefore, presidents 
will not be institutionally reflexive in the way that Zeisberg would want; 
they will err on the side of more secrecy and less democratic accountabil-
ity.  It is no accident that President Barack Obama has continued many 
of President George W. Bush’s policies on detention and surveillance, 
and is now the primary beneficiary of the FISA Amendments Act of 
 
 71. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 72. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 73. Zeisberg, supra note 70, at 808. 
 74. Id. at 811. 
 75. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15, 
24–25 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Par-
tisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006). 
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2008,76 which ratified several of the Bush Administration’s practices and 
gave authority to expand surveillance programs. 
As the Framers recognized, participants in a self-enforcing constitu-
tional system must struggle with each other to keep the system function-
ing appropriately over time.  Arguments about proper democratic func-
tioning in such a system are in politics, not outside it.  Therefore, 
Zeisberg concludes, “Since the constitutional politics of the branches is 
conducted in partisan ways, we can expect that applying the standard of 
processualism will lead to conclusions that will register as partisan in the 
broader political landscape.”77  I agree.  This is one of the consequences 
of a self-enforcing constitutional system.  To paraphrase what is often 
said in First Amendment law, in such a system of government, the only 
cure to the kind of politics we do not like is more politics.78 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s article79 is so rich that I cannot even begin to 
do it justice in this reply.  He has at least five claims, each of which would 
merit (at least) a full article in response.  In particular, I will have to 
leave unanswered his succinct and powerful critique of the American sys-
tem of judicial review; his argument that a parliamentary system without 
judicially enforceable constitutional rights guarantees—like Australia’s—
is superior in terms of democratic legitimacy to the system of living con-
stitutionalism that I describe in Living Originalism; and his doubts about 
why Americans should even have faith in their constitutional system, 
given its obvious imperfections.  These are serious matters, but to give 
them the responses they deserve would turn this article into a second 
book.  And, in many ways, Goldworthy’s criticisms are as much directed 
to American constitutional theory in general as they are to Living 
Originalism. 
Even so, I was unable to limit myself to a single part of his interest-
ing article to comment on.  Instead, I chose two.  The first concerns how 
the analysis in Living Originalism translates to other constitutional cul-
tures.  The second concerns the role that intentions and implications play 
in the interpretation of constitutional texts. 
 
 76. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 
122 Stat. 2436. 
 77. Zeisberg, supra note 70, at 812. 
 78. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating 
that “the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones” and “the remedy to be applied [to evil speech] 
is more speech”). 
 79. Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, Implications, and Underlying Prin-
ciples, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 683. 
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A. The Importance of Constitutional Culture 
Living Originalism argues that in order to be successful, a constitu-
tion like America’s must succeed simultaneously as basic law, higher law, 
and our law.80  By basic law, I mean that the Constitution serves as a 
basic framework for governance that allocates powers and responsibili-
ties, sets up a plan for ordering political life, and offers ways of imple-
menting, expanding, or modifying the plan over time.  By higher law, I 
mean that the Constitution serves as a source of aspiration and a reflec-
tion of values that stand above ordinary law and hold it to account.  By 
our law, I mean that people are attached to the Constitution, feel a sense 
of ownership in it, and see it as the product of their collective efforts as a 
people.  Viewing the Constitution as “our law” helps constitute Ameri-
cans as a single people, dedicated to a political project that extends over 
time, in which past, present, and future generations participate.  This col-
lective identification, in turn, is a constitutional story that allows Ameri-
cans to regard the Constitution as their own even if they never officially 
consented to it. 
But what if a constitution is not like America’s?  Goldsworthy’s ar-
ticle points out that constitutions in different political cultures may not 
serve these functions or serve them in the same way.  Goldsworthy offers 
the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada as examples.81  The British 
Constitution of precedents, customs, and ancient statutes may be basic 
law, but it can be changed by ordinary statute.  Goldsworthy does not be-
lieve that Australia’s Constitution serves an aspirational or higher law 
function because it does not contain rights guarantees (although the Aus-
tralian Supreme Court has implied a few).  Canada’s Constitution is not 
“our law” in the same way as America’s because it began as the British 
North America Act, created and imposed on Canadians by a colonial 
power.82  Nor, in Goldsworthy’s view, do Australia’s or Canada’s consti-
tutions form important—much less central—parts of their national narra-
tives in the same way that the American Constitution does in the United 
States. 
I agree with Goldsworthy’s basic insight.  Living Originalism is a 
book about the American Constitution, and about the distinctive fea-
tures of American political culture that make the Constitution central to 
American political identity.  To apply the arguments of Living 
Originalism to other political cultures, we must first ask what role a con-
stitution plays in a country’s political culture, and we must know some-
thing about that country’s history of constitution making. 
Most constitutions probably do serve as basic law in my sense; as 
the example of Britain’s unwritten constitution suggests, however, they 
 
 80. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 59. 
 81.  Goldsworthy, supra note 79, at 684–90, 694. 
 82. Id. at 694. 
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may do so in importantly different ways.  Many constitutions may not 
serve as higher law in the same way that America’s Constitution does; 
the idea of political aspiration may come from different features of a po-
litical culture and its history.  People in other countries may not point to 
their constitutions as the symbol or embodiment of their political ideals 
and aspirations.  They may point to national traditions, religious institu-
tions, or past political struggles. 
The U.S. Constitution and the history of its development serve a 
crucial role in the country’s national narrative and in Americans’ sense of 
themselves as Americans.  But other constitutions—indeed, perhaps 
most—may not serve as “our law” in the same strong sense as the Amer-
ican Constitution.  Much depends on the circumstances in which a consti-
tution was created—imposed by a former colonial power, drafted under 
Soviet domination, promulgated by a former or current strongman or au-
tocrat, or developed through a popular referendum or democratic pro-
cess widely assumed to be fair and legitimate.  Even in the latter case, a 
constitution may not have a significant role in national identity; for ex-
ample, because the nation is much older than its current constitution, or 
because national identity is primarily ethnically or religiously defined.  
Moreover, few written constitutions are as durable as the American ex-
ample; some are changed fairly often.  Many never manage to obtain the 
sense of pride or reverence that Americans spontaneously show toward 
their ancient Constitution. 
To apply the argument of Living Originalism to other constitutional 
systems, then, one must first look to differences before one can profita-
bly examine similarities.  It may be useful to ask at the outset whether a 
particular constitution serves, or even needs to serve, the functions I 
have described as basic law, higher law, and our law; and if not, why not.  
We may find that some of these aspects are distributed and realized 
elsewhere in the politics and culture of a nation.  To be sure, many of the 
arguments in Living Originalism about interpretation and construction 
can be applied to other political systems.  But in doing so, one must al-
ways take into account the circumstances of American constitutionalism 
and the many ways that American political history and political culture 
have shaped its Constitution, and vice versa. 
B. Constitutional Intentions and Implications 
The final part of Goldsworthy’s article discusses the role of inten-
tions in original-meaning originalism.  Even though advocates of origi-
nal-meaning originalism eschew reference to the intentions of the 
adopters, Goldsworthy points out that one cannot avoid ascribing pur-
poses and intentions to constitutional adopters. 
I agree.  In Living Originalism, I argue that we ascribe purposes or 
intentions to the adopters when we attempt to ascertain original mean-
ing.  For example, we ascribe purposes or intentions to constitutional 
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adopters when we resolve ambiguities in the text in the following situa-
tions: 
1. When we decide whether a certain word or phrase refers to 
one concept rather than another. 
2. When we decide whether the text states a rule, a standard, or 
a principle. 
3. When we decide whether the text employs a nonliteral usage 
or a generally recognized term of art. (Examples include the 
word “writings” in the progress clause or the words “Con-
gress” or “speech” in the First Amendment.) 
4. When we identify certain very basic assumptions in the text, 
for example, that the numerals in the Constitution are stated 
in base ten, not base two, and that the calendar employed is 
the Gregorian calendar, not the Jewish lunar calendar or the 
Mayan calendar. 
We ascribe purposes or intentions in each of these cases because we 
are trying to identify the basic plan for politics on which we are trying to 
build, and we cannot do this without ascribing purposes or intentions to 
the drafters and adopters of the plan.  In my discussion of McGinnis and 
Rappaport’s work, I point out that appeals to original meaning are al-
ways partly anachronistic.  In constitutional interpretation, we do not in-
clude all aspects of the past as part of original meaning, only those parts 
that we think are relevant to the interpretive enterprise we are engaged 
in.  In the same way, we are not interested in all aspects of the adopters’ 
purposes or intentions, only those that are relevant to our enterprise. 
Goldsworthy is particularly concerned with the fourth category 
listed above.  Constitutional texts, like other texts, contain implicit pre-
sumptions; these are tacit assumptions that are taken for granted and 
therefore are not explicitly expressed to the audience.83  Sometimes they 
are not even consciously understood by the speaker or the audience.  
When we identify presuppositions we are ascribing intentions or purpos-
es to the authors of a document.  But this ascription of purpose or inten-
tion is not the same thing as a description of psychological states that 
people held, for three reasons. 
First, people in the adopting generation might not have thought 
about whether the numbers they wrote down were in base two or base 
ten, or whether they were using the Gregorian calendar as opposed to an 
alternative calendar. 
Second, not everyone in the relevant pool of adopters might have 
had the same psychological states (purposes, beliefs, or intentions)—or 
indeed, any at all—with respect to a particular question.  Nevertheless, 
we ascribe purposes or intentions to the group as a whole. 
 
 83. Id. at 700. 
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Third, if we decide that a particular term—say “speech” in the First 
Amendment—is a nonliteral term, it might be reasonable to ascribe to 
the adopters the view that “speech” includes new forms of communica-
tions technology that were not invented at the time they wrote.  Obvious-
ly, they could not have had psychological states of belief, purpose, or in-
tention concerning those nonexistent forms of communications technol-
ogy. 
In each of these cases, we ascribe purposes and intentions to 
adopters, but we do not claim that they had certain psychological states.  
Rather, we are saying in effect that the adopters must have meant that, 
or that a contrary reading would make no sense given their purposes as 
we understand them. 
When the relevant purposes or intentions of the adopters are un-
clear, we resort to the familiar lawyer’s toolkit, using the same tools and 
modalities we would use in constitutional construction, except that we 
employ the tools with the goal of identifying particular aspects of original 
meaning.  Once again, in doing so, we are not trying to identify actual 
psychological states of particular historical individuals or groups of indi-
viduals, but rather, what we think the adopters must have meant, or, put 
another way, what it is reasonable to ascribe to them by their use of 
words. 
Goldsworthy distinguishes between “genuine” and “spurious” im-
plications (or presuppositions) that we might draw from a constitutional 
text.84  Genuine implications, he argues, are those that properly form part 
of the original meaning of a communication, while spurious implications 
are those “which are not really part of the preexisting meaning of a 
communication, but are added to it by interpreters to improve it in some 
respect.”85  Goldsworthy does not mean “spurious” in a pejorative sense; 
rather, he means that spurious implications are those that we cannot 
genuinely infer from a text as what the adopters must have meant.  
Therefore we cannot fairly ascribe these implications to the adopters as 
part of their original meaning. 
Goldsworthy wishes to map the distinction between genuine and 
spurious implications onto the distinction between interpretation and 
construction.  If we are trying to uncover tacit assumptions in a text—
that is, genuine implications—Goldsworthy claims we are engaged in in-
terpretation; if we are not, then we are engaged in construction.86 
While I agree that original meaning should include at least some 
implicit or tacit assumptions, I am not sure that it includes all of them.  
For that reason, I am not sure that Goldsworthy’s distinction between 
genuine and spurious implications maps perfectly onto the distinction be-
 
 84. Id. at 701–03. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 701–02, 706–08. 
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tween interpretation and construction.  That would work only if we de-
fine “genuine implications” far more narrowly than Goldsworthy does. 
First, as a threshold matter, I worry that it may be very difficult in 
practice to identify the boundary between what is a “genuine” and what 
is a “spurious” implication, even though there may be many easy cases 
on both sides of the line.  Second, I am also concerned that if we define 
genuine implications in terms of the “background assumptions” or “tacit 
presuppositions” of speakers at the time of utterance, we undermine the 
distinction between original meanings and original expected applications.  
Indeed, we reintroduce the ideas of original intentions and original un-
derstandings through the back door.  I do not (yet) see a clear demarca-
tion between tacit or background assumptions and original expected ap-
plications or original understandings.  For Goldsworthy’s model to work, 
his class of “genuine implications” must form a fairly small subset of all 
the background assumptions of competent speakers in a language, and 
Goldsworthy has not yet offered an account of what defines that subset. 
To see how the problem arises, consider one of Goldsworthy’s ex-
amples of a genuine implication: when I order a hamburger, I do not 
want it encased in plastic, I do want it to be made of edible materials, and 
so on.87 
Suppose, however, that the adopters order “equal protection of the 
laws” in 1868.  What are their tacit assumptions and “the things that go 
without saying” at the time of this utterance?  Should we include as part 
of their tacit assumptions that “equal protection of the laws” did not 
mean full equality for blacks, equality for married women, or equal rights 
for homosexuals (or, as they were known in those days, sodomites)?  It is 
quite possible that most people assumed that the common-law coverture 
rules would remain in place, and never dreamed that homosexuals would 
be the beneficiaries of the new amendment.  I would argue that these are 
original expected applications, and properly matters of constitutional 
construction.  In other words, not everything that went without saying or 
was widely assumed at the time of adoption is part of original semantic 
meaning. 
Moreover, the notion that things that “go without saying” are part 
of original meaning may be complicated by the fact that there is some-
times nontacit evidence of what the speaker means.  If tacit assumptions 
are properly part of original meaning, why shouldn’t explicitly stated as-
sumptions also count?  Suppose that I order a hamburger and the wait-
ress overhears me saying to my lunch companion “I really cannot stand 
hamburgers encased in plastic.”  In this case, this is not only something 
that goes without saying—it is something I actually said, just not in my 
order to the waitress.  Why shouldn’t these remarks be even stronger ev-
idence of a speaker’s original meaning than mere tacit assumptions?  Put 
 
 87. Id. at 699. 
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differently, if we adopt Goldsworthy’s theory of implications, why should 
the fact that I said this out loud mean that my original meaning does not 
include my objection to a hamburger encased in plastic? 
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, we know that many 
adopters did not wish the new amendment to undermine state bans on 
miscegenation, segregation of common schools, or the common-law cov-
erture rules.  What is the difference between these understandings and 
my explicitly saying: “I would like a hamburger, but I do not want my 
hamburger encased in plastic”? 
Goldsworthy, like me, accepts the distinction between original 
meaning and original expected applications.  So I await a more nuanced 
account before I can sign on to his proposed distinction between genuine 
and spurious implications. 
This matters in part because Goldsworthy would like to associate 
genuine implications with what I call “underlying principles.”88  This 
would make underlying principles part of original meaning.  He quickly 
sees, however, that my account of underlying principles is not really con-
sistent with his distinction.  That is because genuine implications must be 
intended meanings, and my account of underlying principles does not re-
quire that they have been intended by the adopters.  This leads 
Goldsworthy to ask whether the idea of underlying principles—and fidel-
ity to underlying principles—is consistent with original-meaning 
originalism.  Indeed, at the close of his article, he says that what I have 
created is not a “pure” originalism, but a “mongrel cross” of originalism 
and nonoriginalism.89 
In Living Originalism, I argue that we must be faithful not only to 
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution, but also to “underly-
ing principles.”  Underlying principles do not appear in the text.  They 
are constructions that we use to make sense of the plan. 
I distinguish two kinds of underlying principles.  The first are struc-
tural principles.  These principles describe the proper functioning of the 
constitutional system.  In Living Originalism, I mention several exam-
ples: separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, democracy, 
equal citizenship, and the rule of law.  (This list is not meant to be ex-
haustive.)  Structural principles do not have to be associated with a spe-
cific clause in the text.  There is no separation of powers clause in the 
Constitution; rather, we derive this principle from how the various parts 
of the Constitution are supposed to work together. 
The second kind of underlying principles are explanatory or imple-
menting principles.  These are principles that we use to flesh out stand-
ards and principles that actually appear in the text.  Examples are the 
principles against class and caste legislation that explain and implement 
 
 88. Id. at 706–08. 
 89. Id. at 709–10. 
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the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause.  These principles 
also do not appear in the text.  We use them to explain what the guaran-
tee of equal protection means. 
We look to history to develop underlying principles, but they do not 
have to be stated in precisely the way that the adopting generation would 
have stated them.  We also do not have to focus only on the adopting 
generation; we can look to the nation’s entire history, including, for ex-
ample, the civil rights revolution. 
Thus, underlying principles do not have to be originally intended 
principles, and even when versions of them actually were intended, they 
do not always correspond to the way that the adopters would have articu-
lated them.  In fact, the principles that we ascribe to the Constitution do 
not have to be intended by anyone in particular.  For example, some 
structural principles might arise because of the cumulative effect of dif-
ferent amendments and new governmental institutions that nobody could 
have predicted.  The way that we understand older structural principles 
intended by the adopters—like the separation of powers—might change 
as a result of institutional evolution and changing problems of govern-
ance. 
Some other principles that we ascribe to the text today might have 
arisen after its adoption.  For example, I believe that the principle of de-
mocracy is an important structural principle underlying the U.S. Consti-
tution.  But democracy, at least as we understand it today, was not an 
originally intended principle.  The Founding generation believed in re-
publicanism; they believed in representative self-government with vari-
ous devices for limiting, controlling, and diffusing popular passions.  
They were suspicious of democracy, which they believed was likely to 
prove unstable.  They would not have accepted our modern, egalitarian 
vision of democracy, even if we can see connections between today’s 
views and their original rebellion against monarchy and social hierarchy. 
In Living Originalism, I argue that we should be faithful both to the 
original meaning of the text and to underlying principles.  Goldsworthy 
asks how this can be consistent with original-meaning originalism; if un-
derlying principles are merely constructions that might change over time, 
why should we have to be faithful to them at all? 
I believe that we must be faithful to underlying principles because 
they play a crucial role in implementing the Constitution; they are con-
structions on which other subsidiary constructions build.  They are a little 
like the tendons and ligaments that connect the muscles to the bone. 
Constitutional constructions require us to ascribe certain principles 
to the text, either to explain the proper functioning of the constitutional 
system or to explain particular abstract principles and standards that ap-
pear in the text.  Thus, even though separation of powers and federalism 
are not explicitly stated in the text, I believe that we should ascribe these 
principles to the text to make sense of it.  Even though the Fourteenth 
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Amendment does not specifically prohibit “class legislation” or “caste 
legislation,” I believe that these principles motivate and make sense of 
the concept of constitutional equality.  Because we must ascribe these 
principles—or others of the same kind—to the text in order to further 
implement it through construction, we must be faithful to them as well as 
to the text. 
To be sure, people may disagree about these principles.  Some peo-
ple might dispute that the principles against class or caste legislation are 
the best account of constitutional equality.  Others might agree that sep-
aration of powers is an underlying principle but have a different account 
of it.  But our disagreement about the content of these underlying princi-
ples does not obviate our need to use them to understand and construct 
the Constitution. 
If we must ascribe certain principles to make sense of the constitu-
tional plan, then it follows that to be faithful to the plan we must also be 
faithful to these constitutional principles.  Moreover, even though these 
principles are constructions, they give us leverage to criticize the Consti-
tution-in-practice.  For example, suppose that I think that a certain exist-
ing construction violates the separation of powers.  It is true that the sep-
aration of powers does not appear in the text, but it is a construction that 
helps me judge whether other, subsidiary constructions are faithful to the 
Constitution.  Similarly, suppose that I believe an underlying principle of 
the First Amendment is that the government should not be able to dis-
criminate based on political viewpoint.  This principle gives me leverage 
to critique doctrines that do not respect this principle.  When we say that 
we must be faithful to underlying principles, we are saying that we must 
also be faithful to the constructions that we believe are necessary to 
make sense of the constitutional plan and further it. 
These principles might change over time, because we always articu-
late these principles from the present, and our perspective is always 
changing beneath our feet.  History always looks different to us, and 
even the same historical materials look different as we move through his-
tory.  That is why it makes sense to say, at one and the same time, that 
we must be faithful to underlying principles and yet recognize that peo-
ple living in the past or the future might articulate these principles differ-
ently than we do today.  It also makes sense that that people in the pre-
sent might disagree about the nature and scope of the Constitution’s 
underlying principles and claim that they are being faithful to the Consti-
tution (while denying that their opponents are). 
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V. MORAL READINGS AND CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS  
Jim Fleming argues that I offer a moral reading of the Constitution, 
but that this moral reading is not the same as that of Ronald Dworkin, 
who coined the term.90 
I agree with both points.  As noted earlier, Living Originalism ar-
gues that the U.S. Constitution, to be successful, must succeed as basic 
law, higher law, and our law.  To succeed as higher law, the Constitution 
must serve as a source of political and moral aspirations that critiques ex-
isting law and political arrangements and holds them to account.  As I 
understand Fleming’s definition, that is all that is required for my theory 
to be a moral reading.91 
Fleming is also correct that Dworkin’s account of the moral reading 
of the Constitution is different from my theory in important respects.  
Although, like everyone in my generation, I have been deeply influenced 
by Dworkin, we have different jurisprudential commitments, different 
methodological approaches, different ideas about the role of the judici-
ary, and different views about how American politics contributes to con-
stitutional development. 
It might be worth noting a few of these differences: Dworkin is a 
well-known critic of positivism, whereas I am a positivist.  Dworkin re-
jects originalism because it is inconsistent with his theory of constructive 
interpretation; I argue that interpreters must always be faithful to the 
text’s original meaning.92 
Dworkin has famously described courts as the “forum of principle,” 
and views ordinary politics as the home of passion and will that wiser 
courts must restrain and correct.  I argue that constitutional principles 
emerge out of constitutional politics and that courts legitimate the work 
of the political branches as much as they restrain or correct it. 
 
 90. James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 676–77. 
 91. Id. at 674–76. 
 92. Dworkin’s rejection of positivism is a major but perhaps unappreciated reason why Dworkin 
also rejects originalism.  Dworkin argues that judgments about what the law is must flow from the best 
constructive interpretation of the social practice of law.  Constructive interpretation includes two di-
mensions.  First, we ask how well our interpretation fits with the history of the practice we are inter-
preting.  Second, we ask which interpretation is most justified according to the best available moral 
theory.  Depending on how we balance these two dimensions of fit and justification, we may conclude 
that some legal materials and some elements of legal practice are mistakes that are inconsistent with 
the law’s deeper integrity. 
Most originalists start from very different assumptions.  They argue that some aspect or ele-
ment of law (for example, the original semantic meaning) is fixed at adoption and cannot be altered 
without subsequent amendment.  But Dworkin’s model of legal interpretation cannot accept this as-
sumption.  The best constructive interpretation of law might reject some of those elements depending 
on the subsequent history of the practice of constitutional law and the best judgments of political mo-
rality.  The balance of fit and justification might someday require us to disregard or jettison what 
originalists insist must be law because of the act of adoption.  To be sure, if fidelity to the framework 
best serves the dimensions of fit and justification throughout history, Dworkin’s model may be con-
sistent with framework originalism, but the point is that it need not be. 
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Dworkin’s account of constitutional interpretation views judges—
and indeed, an ideal judge, Hercules—as the standard case and treats the 
views of citizens (and politicians) in light of that model; I view the per-
spective of the ordinary citizen as the standard case and treat interpreta-
tion by judges as a special case.  Dworkin believes that there are right an-
swers to hard cases and that constitutional interpreters normally have no 
discretion; I argue that much constitutional construction involves delega-
tion of lawmaking to future generations—including the political branch-
es—and that the political branches usually drive constitutional construc-
tion by courts.  This important difference also affects the role that 
principles play in our respective accounts: Dworkin argues that the exist-
ence of principles within legal materials is a reason why judges lack dis-
cretion; I view principles as delegations that facilitate and channel discre-
tion. 
Dworkin’s work has little to say about social and political mobiliza-
tions; I view them as central to constitutional development and I argue 
that courts legitimate the constructions of sustained national majorities 
over time.  Dworkin spends relatively little time worrying about what po-
litical science teaches us about how courts actually operate, but these 
studies are central to my account of constitutional interpretation and 
constitutional development. 
Dworkin’s theory of constitutional change is based on the traditions 
of common-law decision making by judges; it analogizes constitutional 
development to the writing of a chain novel that seeks to maintain conti-
nuity with the past.  I argue that constitutional change is driven by waves 
of political mobilizations and countermobilizations, and that courts often 
discard significant parts of previous jurisprudence in order to legitimate 
new constitutional regimes. 
Finally, Dworkin’s analyses of constitutional issues—while making 
obeisance to “fit” with the entire corpus of legal materials—usually move 
fairly quickly to discussions of political morality.  I almost always start 
with—and emphasize—text, history, and structure in creating construc-
tions. 
Of course, if you abstract away enough of our theoretical and meth-
odological commitments, our projects do resemble each other, because, 
after all, my framework originalism builds on the key insight of 
Dworkin’s semantic originalism, and both of us seem to talk a lot about 
principles.  If you remove enough letters from our names, we are both 
kin.  But the differences, I think, are as important as the similarities in 
understanding our respective projects. 
Fleming notes one other difference between Dworkin’s theory and 
mine, which he views as a potential failing.  He notes that although my 
work 
justifies one’s having a substantive vision of the Constitution, [it] is 
not itself a substantive vision. . . . [People] who have faith in the 
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Constitution and seek redemption of its aspirations have substan-
tive visions of what the Constitution’s core commitments are. . . . 
But Balkin himself does not put forward a substantive vision of the 
Constitution’s core commitments.93   
Fleming contrasts this to John Hart Ely’s substantive vision of the Con-
stitution as a theory of representative democracy, Cass Sunstein’s vision 
of the Constitution as embodying a theory of deliberative democracy, 
Dworkin’s constitutional vision of a republic of free citizens owned equal 
concern and respect, and Fleming’s own vision of the Constitution “as 
embodying a constitutional democracy protecting basic liberties associat-
ed with deliberative democracy along with deliberative autonomy.”94  He 
wishes that I would announce my own substantive vision of the Constitu-
tion. 
In fact, Living Originalism and Constitutional Redemption do offer a 
substantive vision of the Constitution, but perhaps it is not the kind of 
substantive vision that Fleming is looking for. 
I do not try to connect the Constitution to a single overarching idea 
or attempt to subsume its multiple traditions and its many different fea-
tures into a more general account of liberal political philosophy.  I do not 
attempt this, even though I believe that the Constitution itself is a collec-
tive exercise in realizing a certain historical (and evolving) version of po-
litical liberalism over time.  For me, political liberalism is a moving target 
anyway; it came into being at a certain point in human history, it will 
probably vanish at some point in the future, and who knows what it will 
look like in one hundred years?  Instead of grounding constitutional the-
ory in liberal political theory, it might be better to see our changing vi-
sions of liberal political theory evolving in the context of changing politi-
cal, economic, and social institutions, one of which, of course, is 
constitutional government.  Put differently, I think it is no accident that 
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice is strongly influenced by the institutions 
and the aspirations of the liberal constitutional regime that dominated 
American politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  This is not a criticism 
of Rawls; rather, it is a feature of how political theory develops in con-
versation with the evolution of actual political institutions. 
What then, is the substantive vision of the Constitution offered in 
Living Originalism?  I would say that it has three basic elements. 
First, I argue that the Constitution is a basic framework or plan for 
politics.  It is a plan that offers the possibility but not the certainty of de-
cent politics, for it requires the work of many generations and it is never 
fully completed.  The Constitution is open to the future, not closed by 
the past, and we are not certain whether its story will end well or badly. 
 
 93. Fleming, supra note 90, at 680. 
 94. Id. at 680–81. 
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The Constitution provides a platform for politics in three different 
respects: (1) it is a platform for articulating and enacting popular sover-
eignty in concrete practice (2) it offers a platform for people to build out 
the constitutional system and redeem it through amendment and con-
struction and (3) it provides a platform for persuasion.  It allows people 
to mobilize both in politics and in civil society to persuade each other 
about the meaning of America’s experiment in self-government and to 
argue for the right way forward. 
Second, I argue that the point of our particular system of govern-
ment is to realize in history the promises made in the Declaration of In-
dependence.  As Abraham Lincoln explained, the Declaration is an “ap-
ple of gold” that is framed in a “picture of silver,” which is our written 
Constitution.95 
Third, I argue that, in addition to the Declaration of Independence, 
the Constitution provides an account of its own substantive vision in its 
Preamble: “We the people of the United States,” through successive acts 
of popular sovereignty, have “ordain[ed] and establish[ed] this Constitu-
tion for the United States of America,” “in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”96 
To be sure, one cannot reduce what I have just said to a simple for-
mula, for example, “deliberative democracy.”  But that is because histor-
ical projects like the Constitution are complicated affairs.  They are not 
easily reduced to single ideas, and attempting to do so often leaves out 
important features.  Moreover, as I point out in chapter eight (quoting 
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.), a consti-
tution like America’s is designed to last very a long time, through many 
different crises and problems of governance that we cannot now foresee; 
it is designed to allow many different kinds of people with many different 
kinds of substantive views to live together and work together in peace.97  
Nevertheless, the vision of the Constitution described above is a substan-
tive vision.  In addition, as a participant in the system, I have my own 
views about the best reading of the Constitution’s guarantees of liberty 




 95. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the Constitution and the Union, in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168, 169 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 97. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 135. 
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VI. AGAINST LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN PRINCIPLE? 
The prominent role accorded to principles in Living Originalism 
leads Larry Alexander to doubt that my argument can be squared with 
legal positivism.  Because I also regard myself as a legal positivist, this is 
news to me.  Alexander has no quarrel with the fact that constitutions 
have rules and standards, or that standards authorize legal officials to en-
gage in first order practical reasoning to apply them.98  But he does not 
think that constitutional texts can state principles, because principles are 
nonconclusive legal norms.  When rules and standards apply, they apply 
conclusively to the issue before them, even if they require legal decision 
makers to engage in practical reasoning to apply them.  When principles 
apply to a situation, by contrast, they do not always control.  Instead, we 
must balance principles against competing considerations, including oth-
er principles.99  Thus, what distinguishes principles is that they only have 
“weight,” and therefore may not control even in situations in which they 
apply if they are outweighed.  Alexander argues that this dimension of 
“weight” cannot be posited in advance by legal officials; therefore it is 
inconsistent with positivism, and therefore a positivist account of consti-
tutional theory can have no place for principles.100 
I do not agree.  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, I think, has offered the appro-
priate response to Alexander’s concern: “the distinction between inter-
pretation and construction is an instance of the broader distinction drawn 
by legal positivists between identifying determinate law and exercising 
law-making discretion to cure underdeterminate law.”101  Principles are 
merely one example of legal norms in a mature legal system that direct 
legal officials but that require discretion and judgment in their articula-
tion or application.  (Canons of construction are another example.)  For 
such legal norms to be valid, all that is necessary is that they offer some 
guidance to legal officials to apply the law—or create new law—in one 
way rather than another.  Their weight in the particular situations in 
which they apply need not be precisely determined in advance, as long as 
their weight is not zero. 
As Alexander knows, positivist theories of law can and do account 
for secondary rules in a legal system.102  These secondary rules delegate 
to various legal officials the authority to make new law or to use their 
discretion in developing and applying existing law. 
Secondary rules also form part of the basic conventions of a legal 
system.  Our current legal culture allows for the use of principles and 
other nonconclusive legal norms in legal decision making and legal ar-
 
 98. Lawrence Alexander, The Method of Text and ?: Jack Balkin’s Originalism with No Regrets, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 611, 614–15. 
 99. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 349–50 n.12. 
 100. Alexander, supra note 98, at 616, 619–20. 
 101. Goldsworthy, supra note 79, at 697. 
 102. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77–79, 181–82 (1961). 
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gument.  These legal conventions permit legal officials both to create and 
to implement nonexclusive legal norms.  We use principles as we do be-
cause of the kind of legal culture we inhabit and the legal conventions we 
employ.  Indeed, the ubiquity of arguments from principle is strong evi-
dence that principles are not an illusory feature of legal practice, but part 
of the basic conventions of legal argument in the United States. 
Two instructive examples are common-law courts and administra-
tive agencies that engage in rulemaking and adjudication.  Legal conven-
tions create lawmaking authority in common-law judges, and congres-
sional grants in framework statutes bestow rulemaking and adjudicatory 
authority to bureaucrats in administrative agencies. 
The legal conventions operating in the United States authorize both 
courts and administrative agencies to employ nonconclusive legal norms 
whose weight is not posited in advance but whose legal consequences will 
have to be worked out through discretionary practices of reasoning, prac-
tices which are also authorized by existing legal conventions.  In fact, 
common-law courts and administrative agencies are not only authorized 
to use nonconclusive norms stated in legal texts, they are also authorized 
to ascribe new principles to the existing body of law and to embed these 
ascriptions into future legal texts.  Thus, common-law courts and admin-
istrative agencies are authorized to announce new principles of law from 
the examination of previous legal materials.  Existing conventions re-
quire later decision makers to take these nonexclusive norms into ac-
count in future cases. 
To be sure, these features of common-law courts and administrative 
agencies may be considered undemocratic because they delegate law-
making to unelected judges or unelected bureaucrats.  But that is a dif-
ferent concern from the claim that the use of principles is somehow in-
consistent with legal positivism. 
As noted above, principles are not the only nonconclusive legal 
norms in our legal system.  The traditional canons of statutory construc-
tion are also nonconclusive legal norms that only have weight and that 
must be balanced against competing factors.  For example, the canons 
that we should avoid redundancies in a statute, that words should have 
the same meaning throughout a statute, that the reach of a statute is lim-
ited to the examples specifically enumerated (expressio unius), or that 
statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed do 
not always prevail; legal decision makers balance these canons against 
other considerations, including other canons of construction.  Just as in 
the case of legal principles, the weight accorded to canons of construction 
cannot be posited in advance.  Yet I have no reason to think that canons 
of statutory construction are not valid norms in the American legal sys-
tem, much less that they are inconsistent with legal positivism. 
The notion that such practices cannot form part of our legal conven-
tions is mysterious to me.  It is like the old joke about baptism.  I not on-
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ly believe that nonconclusive legal norms can be part of a conventionalist 
system of law, I have seen it done.  Indeed, if such a ubiquitous feature of 
legal argument were really inconsistent with positivism and therefore had 
to be explained away as an illusion, that would be a serious problem for 
positivism, because positivism seeks to account for our actual practices of 
legal behavior.  Of course, over the years Dworkin has tried to argue that 
positivism is inconsistent with the existence of nonexclusive legal norms; 
for some reason, Alexander seems eager to agree with him that the two 
cannot be reconciled.  But I would not surrender this particular point so 
easily. 
VII. A PERFECT CONSTITUTION OR A FALLEN CONSTITUTION? 
Gerard Magliocca’s interesting article, building on Walter Bagehot’s 
theory of the British Constitution, argues that the U.S. Constitution has a 
dignified existence, which he compares to the role that the British mon-
archy plays.  The Constitution must be perfect, mysterious, and, like 
Caesar’s wife, above suspicion.  Or, as Magliocca puts it in the title of his 
article, in order for our Constitution to work properly, people must be-
lieve that “The Constitution Can Do No Wrong.”103 
As noted previously, I argue that in order to be successful, the U.S. 
Constitution (although not all constitutions) must simultaneously oper-
ate as “basic law,” as “higher law,” and as “our law.”  By higher law I 
mean that the Constitution—and especially its abstract statements of 
principle—presents itself as a symbol of aspiration that stands above cur-
rent practices, critiques them, and holds them to account.  Thus, I would 
agree with Magliocca that treating the Constitution as “higher law” per-
forms an important symbolic function.  Moreover, I also distinguish be-
tween the Constitution as a basic plan of government that must be filled 
out over time and the Constitution-in-practice, which is the set of institu-
tions we currently live under.  Distinguishing between the Constitution 
and the Constitution-in-practice, and viewing the Constitution as “higher 
law” helps us critique the Constitution-in-practice. 
Nevertheless, I think that the analogy Magliocca wants to draw with 
the dignified role of the British Monarchy, while insightful, is also mis-
leading in important respects.  In Living Originalism, and in Constitu-
tional Redemption, I argue that our Constitution, far from being perfect, 
is always “fallen.”104  That is, it is perpetually in need of redemption be-
cause it is imperfect.  Both the Constitution as a basic framework for 
governance and the Constitution-in-practice always risk becoming—or 
already are—“a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell,” to use 
 
 103. Gerard N. Magliocca, The Constitution Can Do No Wrong, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 723. 
 104. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
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William Lloyd Garrison’s phrase.105  Moreover, if the Constitution truly is 
“our law” it may be defective and evil because of defects and evils within 
the United States.  This is the problem of constitutional evil, and it gives 
rise to the possibility of constitutional tragedy—that the American peo-
ple, working through the forms and practices of the American Constitu-
tion, might pursue a course of action that leads to disaster.106 
The most obvious example of constitutional tragedy is the Civil 
War, in which hundreds of thousands of people died.  In his second inau-
gural address Abraham Lincoln argued that the war was God’s punish-
ment for Americans’ attempt—both in the North and the South—to 
profit from slavery:  
if God wills that [the war] continue, until all the wealth piled by the 
bond-man’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be 
sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be 
paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand 
years ago, so still it must be said “the judgments of the Lord, are 
true and righteous altogether.”107 
All of this suggests that the “higher law” function of the Constitu-
tion works differently than the dignified status of the British Monarchy. 
In Constitutional Redemption I speak of the conceit of “Ideal Con-
stitutionalism”—the belief that the real or true Constitution somehow 
avoids the evils of the Constitution-in-practice.  But I do not endorse this 
way of thinking; quite the contrary, I believe that it is a form of constitu-
tional idolatry that undermines our efforts at redeeming the Constitu-
tion-in-practice.  My work argues that constitutional aspirationalism re-
quires recognizing the presence and the possibility of constitutional evil.  
The Constitution can serve as higher law only because Americans must 
always see that the Constitution-in-practice is fallen and compromised.  
This drives them to redeem it.  The Constitution-in-practice may be very 
unjust indeed, and it may be used to justify all sorts of terrible and evil 
policies.  Many constitutional dissenters live in dark times when the Con-
stitution-in-practice is far from an ideal or pure object of admiration.  To 
accept the Constitution’s legitimacy and its right to rule over them, they 
must have constitutional faith that constitutional redemption is possible.  
This vision of aspirationalism seems to be the opposite of what 
Magliocca is concerned with in his comparison to the British Monarchy. 
Moreover, Magliocca’s point is that the Constitution, like the Brit-
ish monarchy, operates successfully only if people regard it as mysterious 
and perfect.  But in Living Originalism, and in Constitutional Redemp-
tion, my argument goes in the opposite direction.  I argue that the fact 
 
 105. WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD 
GARRISON 205 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 106. BALKIN, supra note 104, at 7–8, 81–82. 
 107. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN, supra note 95, at 332, 333. 
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that people are aggrieved, and see the Constitution-in-practice as imper-
fect, is what moves them to engage in constitutional politics and to per-
suade their fellow citizens to construct the Constitution differently, or, in 
some cases, to amend it. 
In my account, therefore, the imperfections of the Constitution-in-
practice—the fact that it is “fallen”—are just as important to the success 
of the constitutional system as the belief that the true Constitution, right-
ly interpreted, is basically just. 
The British Monarchy does not appear to operate in this way.  That 
is, the flaws and failings of the actual British royal family do not appear 
to act as a spur to the improvement of British institutions, based on the 
belief that this will redeem the royal family or achieve the “real” or 
“genuine” royal family.  To understand how aspirationalism works in the 
American constitutional system, we must recognize that Magliocca’s 
analogies will take us only so far. 
VIII. THE DANGERS OF TOO MUCH CONSTITUTION TALK? 
Adam Samaha’s subtle article focuses on the effects for political le-
gitimacy of what he calls “loose constitutional discourse,” by which he 
means a political system in which many if not most policy disputes can be 
argued as disputes about the Constitution.108  Samaha is worried that in 
political cultures with this feature, the stakes of politics will seem higher, 
people will become more polarized, and people who lose political battles 
will feel less loyalty for the system because in their eyes the Constitution 
has been betrayed.  He worries that a political culture with loose consti-
tutional discourse will undermine democratic legitimacy in the long run.  
Samaha’s discussion of the pros and cons of loose constitutional dis-
course in a political culture is quite rich, and he shows how either too 
loose or too limited a space of constitutional discourse might have bale-
ful effects. 
Samaha characterizes me as a “discourse theorist” who believes that 
the way that we talk to each other matters for democratic legitimacy.109  
He assumes that my theory of text and principle is designed to enhance 
democratic legitimacy by declaring the ground rules of discourse in such 
a way as to produce certain effects, and therefore I should be particularly 
worried if the theory leads democratic legitimacy to be undermined. 
Of course, I would be worried if America’s protestant constitutional 
culture undermined its democratic legitimacy.  But I do not consider my-
self a “discourse theorist” of the kind Samaha imagines, and I am not ad-
vocating a form of proper discourse that, if adopted, will help ensure 
democratic legitimacy.  To be sure, I offer a normative framework for 
 
 108. Adam M. Samaha, Talk About Talking About Constitutional Law, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 
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constitutional interpretation and a positive description of the processes 
of constitutional change, in which protestant constitutionalism plays an 
important role.  I also try to show how the processes I describe in the 
positive account further democratic legitimacy (although they do not 
guarantee it).  Nevertheless, I do not think that my theory of text and 
principle causes people to talk in particular ways that enhance or under-
mine democratic legitimacy. 
Instead, I believe that in theories of constitutional interpretation, 
“ought” implies “can”: a theory of interpretation should be broadly con-
sistent with the kind of constitutional and political culture that America 
has actually developed.  As just noted, America has a protestant consti-
tutional culture: people often disagree about what the Constitution 
means in practice, they often move back and forth freely between policy 
arguments and constitutional arguments, and they use claims about the 
Constitution to talk back to political officials and especially judges.  In 
this culture, there is no clear dividing line between political disagreement 
and constitutional disagreement, and the boundary shifts as a result of 
changing political concerns and mobilizations.  Political entrepreneurs 
can sometimes convert what look like quotidian disputes about public 
policy into disagreements about constitutional interpretation, and, vice 
versa, turn what were once heated constitutional disputes into workaday 
discussions of policy. 
This feature of American constitutional culture long predates cur-
rent scholarly interest in popular constitutionalism.  Indeed, that current 
interest is largely a rediscovery of a very basic feature of our constitu-
tional culture that goes back to the Founding and has persisted to the 
present day.  In the antebellum period, for example, many policy dis-
putes over land, tariffs, slavery, and foreign policy were often stated in 
constitutional terms or in terms that were only one step removed.  This 
practice continued after the Civil War; however, the increasing im-
portance of the federal judiciary—due to the Reconstruction Amend-
ments and the expansion of federal jurisdiction—created new layers of 
discussion about who had authority to pronounce on constitutional mat-
ters.  The social mobilizations of the nineteenth and especially the twen-
tieth century regularly either made constitutional claims or responded to 
such claims.  Thus, mixing policy with constitutional politics is not the in-
vention of Living Originalism or of the recent scholarly focus on popular 
constitutionalism; it is as American as apple pie. 
It is important not to confuse the theorization of protestant constitu-
tionalism with its effects.  We would have a protestant constitutional cul-
ture regardless of whether I wrote Living Originalism.  Even without the 
permission granted by scholarly tomes, social and political mobilizations 
throughout American history have felt authorized to elevate policy disa-
greement into constitutional disagreement and make claims on the Con-
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stitution.  As so often is the case, scholarship arises later to explain what 
has already happened. 
Samaha sees—entirely correctly—that I am not purely neutral on 
this state of affairs.  I think that our protestant constitutional culture is 
on the whole a good thing and that its existence, on the whole, helps 
promote democratic legitimacy.  I also think that our protestant constitu-
tional culture has shaped the kind of political and legal institutions we 
have, and that these institutions probably would work less well if our 
constitutional culture were not so assiduously protestant. (Of course, if 
the culture were different, so too might be the institutions.) 
Nevertheless, the point of Living Originalism is not to argue that we 
should have a protestant constitutional culture.  We already do, and 
there is little that Living Originalism could do to change that fact.  Rath-
er, Living Originalism asks what sort of interpretive theory makes the 
most sense given the sort of constitutional culture we have. 
Academic theory might affect political practice at the margins, but 
in this case I am somewhat skeptical that the effect is very pronounced.  
Living Originalism argues that the choice of interpretive theory does not 
do very much work in constraining judges; it argues that institutional 
constraints on the judiciary come mostly from elsewhere in the system.  
In the same way, I assume that an academic theory of “appropriate” con-
stitutional discourse probably does not do very much work in either 
spawning or preventing the proliferation of constitutional claims and the 
use of constitutional language in policy disputes.  America’s protestant 
constitutional culture, and the loose nature of constitutional discourse 
that flows from that culture, is probably caused by far larger features of 
American history, culture, and politics.  These are the real source of 
Samaha’s worries. 
It is important, then, that we not confuse Samaha’s concerns with 
my goals in writing Living Originalism.  Samaha assumes that I am inter-
ested in offering a discourse theory that will pacify conflict and smooth 
over hurt feelings.  But that is not my project, first, because I do not be-
lieve that academic theories could do this sort of work even if they tried, 
and second, because my interest is in democratic legitimacy in the face of 
continuous change, and change is about disruption, disagreement, and 
dissensus.  I am probably more sanguine than Samaha is about the long 
tradition—dating back to the Founding itself—of mixing constitutional 
questions with policy questions, and employing constitutional language 
in political disputes.  For me, the life of the Constitution has been per-
petual disagreement, not pacifying consensus.  I do not ascribe to “dia-
logic” theories of constitutional change because “dialogue” is altogether 
too nice a term to describe much of democratic politics.  A lot of what 
people are doing in a democracy is not dialogue: they are mobilizing, de-
nouncing, sermonizing, pushing, and pushing back. 
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I am interested in how people make claims on the Constitution both 
to legitimate and to critique the Constitution-in-practice.  For me, it is 
particularly important that dissenters can call on the Constitution to 
speak truth to power in dark times.  But constitutional theories do not 
cause the dissent (although specific constitutional claims may help frame 
grievances), and constitutional theories do not ensure that dissenters will 
ultimately feel either comforted or alienated. 
I believe that our different theoretical concerns may lead Samaha to 
misunderstand the point of Part II of Living Originalism, which shows 
how to apply the method of text and principle to concrete examples.  He 
assumes that the chapters on the commerce clause and the Fourteenth 
Amendment are designed to calm people down by showing that the 
method of text and principle, in practice, leads to very establishment 
conclusions.  That is, its basic function is conservative.110 
But that is not the purpose of these chapters.  They are designed to 
show other lawyers how to use the method in practice, and to show, in 
my opinion, how important features of the modern state have been faith-
ful to the Constitution’s original meaning and underlying principles.  In 
these chapters, I am trying to persuade people as a participant in the 
practice of constitutional argument.  Even so, in the introduction to Part 
II, I note that other people with different commitments could use the 
same methods to dissent from current arrangements, and I also note that 
some of my positions are not establishment at all—they are currently 
“off the wall.”111 
The most important part of Samaha’s critique, at least for me, is his 
skepticism about the link between protestant constitutional culture and 
democratic legitimacy.  I argue that a set of cultural, political, and institu-
tional processes that produce new constitutional constructions—
processes that have developed over long periods of time—make it possi-
ble for people with very different views to live together and claim the 
Constitution as their own even if their views do not win out. 
Samaha is skeptical about these processes of constitutional devel-
opment, especially in the current moment.  He worries that the mere 
possibility of future constitutional redemption may not be sufficient to 
sustain democratic legitimacy, because change may not come quickly, or 
even at all.  Given the polarized times in which we live, Samaha asks why 
people today should even have constitutional faith in America, or its 
Constitution.  Moreover, in such angry times, why does protestant consti-
tutionalism not enhance polarization, and therefore the fragmentation of 
society?  Perhaps constitutional protestantism has made people feel even 
more alienated from their government.  Perhaps the reason why the Tea 
Party is so angry is that the culture encourages them to use constitutional 
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arguments and to insist that their Constitution is being hijacked by pow-
erful forces they cannot control.  Perhaps if the Tea Party did not invoke 
the Constitution so often, they would be less angry at Barack Obama 
and, to quote Rodney King, we could all just get along. 
It is certainly possible that constitutional protestantism is undermin-
ing America’s democratic legitimacy, but I doubt it.  Americans have 
been invoking the Constitution in policy disputes since the Founding, 
and over the long haul it does not seem to have debilitated American 
democracy.  Indeed, protestant constitutionalism seems to encourage a 
sense of ownership in the Constitution and the right to declare the direc-
tion that America should go.112  This is not the first time that Americans 
have felt that powerful people have been abusing their charter of liberty; 
it is not the first time that they have elevated policy disagreements into 
calls for taking back the Constitution, and it is not the first time that 
people have insisted that their opponents are trampling on America’s 
most hallowed document.  Indeed, one might argue that continual re-
course to the Constitution has been an important factor in many of the 
political and social mobilizations that have led to increased democratiza-
tion (and therefore democratic legitimacy) over time. 
Even so, Samaha also worries that constitutional language raises the 
temperature of political dispute and makes it more difficult for opposing 
sides to compromise.  But American history does not seem to demon-
strate this.  Quite the contrary, on issue after issue—whether it be feder-
alism, race, foreign policy, or civil liberties, people still seem to reach 
compromises even though they make constitutional arguments.  Much of 
Reva Siegel’s recent work concerns how social mobilizations adjust and 
redescribe their constitutional claims over time because of their need to 
appeal to the majority of Americans.113  Constitutional language, then, 
may not create an unbridgeable chasm, and surface appearances of irrec-
oncilable differences may be deceptive.  We may need to pay more atten-
tion to the deeper causes of polarization in contemporary society; con-
versely, we may need to explore, as Siegel has, how constitutional 
discourse that seeks majority support causes opposing sides in a constitu-
tional controversy to borrow ideas from each other over time. 
 
 112. See BALKIN, supra note 104, at 235–38; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Consti-
tutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 25, 26–29 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); 
see also Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. 
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 373, 378–79 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution 
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 300–01, 314–15 (2001). 
 113. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1409 (2006) (describing the effects of 
1970s mobilizations and countermobilizations on sex-equality claims); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: 
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1470, 1475, 1545–46 (2004) (describing the effects of political struggle on the meaning of Brown 
v. Board of Education);  Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1649, 1656–57, 1664–68 (2008) (describ-
ing changing forms of antiabortion arguments). 
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It is true, of course, that American democracy did break down in 
the 1860s.  But I am not at all sure that a major reason was too much 
constitutional discourse.  (One should remember that the Dred Scott case 
gave the South precisely what it wanted in constitutional terms, and the 
South still seceded following Lincoln’s election.)  Similarly, I do not 
think that the recent radicalization of the conservative movement and 
the contemporary Republican Party is due to its promiscuity in making 
constitutional claims. 
The Constitution offers familiar tropes and a familiar language for 
arguing about where Americans have come from, where we are now, and 
where we should go.  It is like a comfortable pair of shoes in which we 
are accustomed to walking.  As I argue in Constitutional Redemption, this 
language is not neutral in its effects, and it can limit our political imagina-
tions.114  At the same time, this language, from long use, has proven a 
supple, flexible, and adaptable tool in political disputes.  I do not think 
that recourse to constitutional language is the cause of our current politi-
cal problems; I rather think it is the manifestation of them. 
IX. COMMERCE AND INTERCOURSE 
I owe an enormous debt to Randy Barnett’s work.  I think it is safe 
to say that Living Originalism would not be possible without Barnett’s 
2004 book, Restoring the Lost Constitution.115  In an age when many peo-
ple had given up on constitutional theory—as opposed to constitutional 
history—Barnett believed that it was possible to ground a theory of con-
stitutional interpretation on a theory of constitutional legitimacy. 
Although Barnett and I agree on many aspects of constitutional 
theory, we do not agree on everything.  And one place we part company 
is the proper interpretation and construction of the commerce power.116  
That should not be surprising.  I am a liberal defending the modern state, 
while he is a libertarian trying to promote classical liberalism and limited 
government.  I argue for a broad construction of federal power and a 
presumption of constitutionality, while he has argued for a presumption 
of liberty. 
 
 114. BALKIN, supra note 104, at 81–85, 103–07, 115–16. 
 115. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
(2004). 
 116. I will not have time to address Barnett’s discussion of the continuing relevance of Resolution 
VI of the Virginia Plan, which was the original basis of Congress’s enumerated powers.  My views—
and my response to Barnett’s arguments—are already adequately stated in Living Originalism.  See 
BALKIN, supra note 1, at 143–47 & 376–77 n.27. 
Kurt Lash, however, has offered a series of new arguments about my views on Resolution VI.  
See generally Kurt T. Lash, “Resolution VI”: National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems 
Under Article I, Section 8 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series No. 10-40, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1894737.  I 
have responded to Lash’s draft in a short essay.  Jack Balkin, Resolution VI As a Principle of Construc-
tion, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 12, 2011, 5:55 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/08/resolution-vi-as-
principle-of.html.   
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Indeed, our differences on the question of federal power are worth 
noting because they show how two scholars using similar methods can 
nevertheless arrive at very different conclusions.  I regard this as a fea-
ture, and not a disadvantage, of the method of text and principle.  As I 
argue in Living Originalism, the point of a theory of interpretation is not 
simply to resolve all controversies, but to offer a platform for persuasion 
about the Constitution by people with different points of view. 
The meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution is ambiguous; it 
might refer to several different concepts, and so we must bring the tradi-
tional lawyer’s tools—text, history, structure, precedent, ethos, and con-
sequences—to bear to decide on the best account of its meaning.  Apply-
ing these tools, Barnett and I reach different conclusions.  Barnett adopts 
what I call the “trade theory” of the commerce clause.  He argues that 
commerce involves the trade or exchange of commodities.117  I argue that 
in 1787 the word “commerce” meant “intercourse,” which meant ex-
change and movements back and forth.118  In 1787 the primary definition 
of “commerce” was “intercourse or exchange,” and the primary defini-
tion of “intercourse” was “commerce or exchange.”119  This suggests to 
me that the words “commerce” and “intercourse” were either synonyms 
or very close in meaning. 
Under my model, which I call the “interaction theory,” the com-
merce clause gives Congress the power to regulate intercourse—
exchanges of people, things, and communications—with foreign nations, 
with the Indian tribes, and among the several states.120 
Barnett’s theory has definite advantages.  The major concern of the 
Framers that led to the commerce clause was rational regulation of trade, 
and allowing the new nation to present a unified front in negotiations 
with foreign powers.  Barnett shows that the notion of commerce as trade 
of commodities was very common.  He did a search in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette from 1728 to 1800 tracing every use of the word “commerce,” 
and he found no examples in which the word unambiguously referred to 
anything other than the exchange of commodities (or navigation—a 
point to which I will return momentarily).121 
But Barnett’s theory also has significant disadvantages.  As I show 
in Living Originalism, it cannot explain Congress’s expansive power over 
 
 117. BARNETT, supra note 115, at 278–91. 
 118. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 149; SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (9th ed. 1790) [hereinafter JOHNSON, 9th ed.] (defining “commerce” and “intercourse”); 1 
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773) [hereinafter JOHNSON, 
4th ed.] (defining “commerce” and “intercourse”).  
 119. See BALKIN, supra note 1, at 149 & 380 n.38; JOHNSON 9th ed., supra note 118 (defining 
“commerce” and “intercourse”); JOHNSON, 4th ed., supra note 118 (defining “commerce” and “inter-
course”). 
 120. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 155 (arguing that under the interaction theory, Congress can reach 
commercial intercourse in all its branches and exchanges of people, communications, and things). 
 121. Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
623, 636–37. 
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foreign relations and its plenary power over immigration.122  Since the 
late nineteenth century, this problem has been solved by postulating an 
unenumerated plenary power over foreign relations.  We know the 
Framers believed that control over foreign relations was one of the cen-
tral reasons for forming the new Constitution.  If so, it is strange that 
they did not think to bestow a general power to regulate foreign relations 
in addition to the powers to declare war.  But once we understand 
“commerce” in its eighteenth century sense of “intercourse,” the mystery 
is solved.  Congress has the power to regulate commerce—that is, all in-
teractions and intercourse—with foreign nations and with the Indian 
tribes.  The fact that this overlaps with other powers is not a problem.  
Many of Congress’s enumerated powers overlap, especially in the area of 
war and foreign relations.  The point of the list is to ensure that Congress 
has all the power it needs to deal with foreign questions, problems, and 
threats in which a unified national policy is necessary.  The interaction 
theory of commerce achieves this crucial goal of the Constitution’s 
Framers. 
There is a second major difficulty with the trade theory.  As Barnett 
recognizes, the idea of trade or exchange of commodities does not literal-
ly include navigation.123  But we know that the Framers used the terms 
“navigation” and “commerce” interchangeably.124  Moreover, not all nav-
igation was for purposes of trade or exchange of commodities. 
There are two possible solutions.  The first is that the word “com-
merce” as it appears in the Constitution is a nonliteral usage, like 
“speech” or “press” in the First Amendment, or “writings” in the pro-
gress clause.  It is a metonym, where a thing stands for something related 
to it.  Because international (and much interstate) trade was conducted 
in ships, “commerce” metonymically extends to navigation.  The second 
solution is to argue that even if the Framers were wrong to identify 
commerce with navigation, Congress can reach navigation through the 
necessary and proper clause.  
If “commerce” means “intercourse,” however, we do not have to as-
sume that the word was used nonliterally.  The power to regulate inter-
course would include not only the power to regulate interstate and inter-
national trade but also the power to regulate interstate and international 
networks of transportation and communication. 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous discussion in Gibbons v. Og-
den supports my approach.125  Counsel for Ogden argued that Congress 
had no authority to regulate navigation, because commerce meant the 
 
 122. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 157–59. 
 123. BARNETT, supra note 115, at 291–92. 
 124. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 449–53, 631 (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1911); see also BARNETT, supra note 114, at 292–93 (noting that at the Philadelphia 
Convention, regulation of navigation was debated in the context of the commerce power and the cou-
plet “commerce and navigation” appeared four times during the ratification debate). 
 125. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 186–240 (1824). 
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trade of commodities and did not include navigation per se; moreover, 
not all navigation was for the purpose of trading commodities.126  Mar-
shall rejected this argument outright.  He did not rely on the necessary 
and proper clause.  Instead he argued that navigation was included in the 
concept of commerce as intercourse: 
The counsel for the appellee would limit [the meaning of “com-
merce”] to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of com-
modities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation.  This 
would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of 
its significations.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is some-
thing more: it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial inter-
course between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and 
is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.  
The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce 
between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, 
which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one na-
tion into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules 
for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying 
and selling, or of barter.127 
It is true that Marshall wrote these words thirty-seven years after 
the 1787 Philadelphia Convention.  Yet, these were not novel ideas.  We 
must remember that before he became Chief Justice, Marshall was a 
leader of the Virginia Federalist Party and helped lead the fight for rati-
fication in Virginia.128  He was one of the nation’s most accomplished 
lawyers during the early years of the Republic, a trusted friend and advi-
sor to George Washington, and an almost indispensable member of the 
early Federalist Party, leading Presidents Washington and Adams to of-
fer him positions as Attorney General, Minister to France, Associate Jus-
tice, Secretary of State, and Chief Justice (the last two of which he ac-
cepted).129  If there is a dispute over whether the original meaning of 
“commerce” is “intercourse,” I am happy to ally myself with John Mar-
shall on this question. 
One might object that if “intercourse” includes exchanges of com-
munications as well as people and things, it would seem to give Congress 
power over interstate and foreign communications (which in fact, it has 
today under the commerce power).  Yet during the ratification debates 
James Wilson had reassured his listeners that, under the 1787 Constitu-
tion, and before the Bill of Rights, Congress would not have the power to 
interfere with the freedom of the press or the power “to regulate literary 
publications.”130   
 
 126. See id. at 76–77 (argument of counsel for respondent). 
 127. Id. at 189–90. 
 128. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 5, 112–43 (1996). 
 129. See id. at 5–6, 7, 15. 
 130. James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 167, 168 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (“For instance, the liberty of the press, 
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Wilson surely did not mean that Congress could not regulate com-
munications generally, as he immediately goes on to point out that Con-
gress could regulate publications within the District of Columbia.131  His 
point, rather, is that Congress could reach communications only within 
its assigned powers.  There is no reason to think that it could not; other-
wise Congress would have been powerless to regulate fraud in defense 
appropriations, or the unauthorized communication of military secrets.  
Moreover, the First Amendment did not deny Congress the power to 
pass any law that concerned speech or press—compare the language of 
the Establishment Clause, which does prevent laws “respecting” estab-
lishments of religion.  Rather, it prohibited laws that abridged the free-
dom of speech or the freedom of the press. 
 One of the early acts of Congress was the Postal Act of 1792—
passed a mere two months after the ratification of the First Amend-
ment.132  It subsidized the delivery of newspapers through the mails and 
regulated the ways that papers, letters, and other mail moved from ships 
to post offices.  Despite what Wilson may have represented in 1787, this 
was a regulation of the press and of literary publications; the point, how-
ever, is that the Founders did not believe that these regulations violated 
the freedom of the press.133  Similarly, today Congress can regulate tele-
communications networks and establish technological standards and 
rules of the road—like the regular announcement of assigned call let-
ters—even though protected speech travels through them, as long as the 
regulations do not “abridge” the “freedom of speech.”  In the same fash-
ion, Congress can punish the use of telecommunications networks for 
fraud or crime without abridging the freedom of speech or the press. 
Even so, most of the 1792 Act was probably passed under the power 
to establish post offices and post roads; only part of it—regulating letters 
conveyed by ship—would have required Congress’s commerce power.  
Yet if “commerce” means “intercourse,” the postal power would have 
been superfluous; Congress should have been able to regulate the inter-
state delivery of newspapers under the commerce power.  Doesn’t this 
undermine the argument that the power to regulate commerce includes 
the power to regulate interstate and international communications? 
It does not.  All forms of originalism must take technological 
change into account.  Originalists have repeatedly rejected the idea that 
new communications technologies cannot constitute “speech” simply be-
 
which has been a copious source of declamation and opposition, what control can proceed from the 
Federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of national freedom?  If, indeed, a 
power similar to that which has been granted for the regulation of commerce had been granted to reg-
ulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to stipulate that the liberty of the press 
should be preserved inviolate, as that the impost should be general in its operation.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232. 
 133. On the other hand, the 1792 Act created a postal monopoly, which arguably limited the free-
dom of the press, although it was not so understood at the time.  Id. § 14.  Later sessions of Congress 
would offer less benign regulations to prevent abolitionist literature from moving through the mails. 
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cause the Framers did not know about them and could not have imag-
ined them.  Rather, as new technologies arise, we recognize that phe-
nomena that the Framers understood were merely special cases of more 
general concepts of speech and press.  The same reasoning, I believe, ap-
plies to the power to regulate “commerce.”  As new technologies of 
transportation and communication arise, we see that situations well-
known to the Founders were merely special cases of more general phe-
nomena of interstate and international transportation and communica-
tions networks; these more general phenomena properly fall within the 
power to regulate commerce. 
At the time of the Founding, most long distance travel and much 
long distance communication were conducted through ships, which were 
clearly subjects of regulation under the commerce power.  Interstate and 
international networks of transportation and communication in the 1780s 
depended heavily on ships and shipping technology.  That is why the 
1792 Postal Act also regulated the delivery of letters by ship.134  Overland 
transportation was difficult and dangerous.  Hence, it was obvious to the 
Framers—and to John Marshall—that commerce—whether involving ex-
changes of goods, letters, or persons—included navigation. 
Aside from letters delivered by ship, the most important example of 
interstate telecommunications technologies and telecommunications 
networks in 1787 was a system of post offices and post roads.  Notably, 
the Framers did think that Congress should have power to regulate them, 
including the movement of newspapers through them. 
Today, it is easy for us to see that all sorts of transportation net-
works—and not merely navigation—must fall within the commerce pow-
er.  But that is because we live in a different technological era than the 
Framers.  In fact, in the first part of the nineteenth century, some courts 
doubted that any transportation other than navigation was part of com-
merce.135  Once railroads became commonplace, however, they reshaped 
people’s understandings, and courts eventually understood them to be 
instruments of commerce that fell within the commerce power. 
The same point, I would argue, is true of telecommunications tech-
nologies.  The Framers saw the need for a power to create a post office 
and post roads, as well as the need to regulate navigation, but they did 
not see these two things as aspects of a single phenomenon that we 
would call telecommunications networks.  The general ideas of telecom-
munication technologies and telecommunications networks were not sa-
lient to the Framers, in part because telecommunications technologies 
were comparatively underdeveloped.  There were no telephones, radios, 
or televisions, and telegraphs would not become commercially viable un-
til well into the nineteenth century. 
 
 134. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, §§ 10, 12, 13, 26, 1 Stat. 232, 235–36, 239. 
 135. See BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE §§ 3.02, 3.03 (1999) (tracing the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrines). 
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Once telegraphs were invented, however, courts eventually came to 
recognize them as instruments of commerce—and not merely as an ex-
tension of post offices and post roads.136  Rather, telegraphs were instru-
ments of intercourse; they were for sending messages and intelligence 
back and forth.137  Just as new communications technologies have gradu-
ally changed our ideas about what constitutes “speech,” so too they have 
changed our views about what constitutes “commerce.”  That is why tele- 
communications networks fall within the meaning of commerce as inter-
course even though the Framers never dreamed of the Internet. 
Indeed, if “commerce” means only the trade of commodities, but 
not the exchange of persons and ideas, it is difficult to see how Congress 
can regulate new telecommunications networks and technologies, espe-
cially when they are used by private parties for conversation that is not 
for purposes of trade.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, for ex-
ample, much radio communication was amateur radio communication, 
and ham radio still exists today.  It is true that Congress could regulate 
the sale and purchase of ham radio equipment across state lines, but this 
principle would not extend to regulating telecommunications generally. 
If we adopt Barnett’s theory of the commerce clause, the only po-
tential source for regulating new forms of telecommunications in the text 
of the Constitution would be the power “to establish post-offices and 
post-roads.”  But then one would have to show that these terms were un-
derstood to be nonliteral usages like “speech” and that the term “estab-
lish” also included the power to regulate private methods of telecommu-
nication.138  This seems a bit of a stretch, especially if we adopt Barnett’s 
presumption of liberty that congressional power should be strictly con-
strued in the interests of avoiding unnecessary regulation where possible. 
On the other hand, if I am correct that the original meaning of 
“commerce” is “intercourse,” Congress would have the power to regu-
 
 136. See, e.g., Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1877). 
 137. As Chief Justice Waite explained: 
Both commerce and the postal service are placed within the power of Congress, because, being 
national in their operation, they should be under the protecting care of the national government. 
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the post-
al service known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the pro-
gress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circumstances.  
They extend from the horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-vessel to the steam-
boat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad to the telegraph, as 
these new agencies are successively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing popula-
tion and wealth.  They were intended for the government of the business to which they relate, at 
all times and under all circumstances.  As they were intrusted to the general government for the 
good of the nation, it is not only the right, but the duty, of Congress to see to it that intercourse 
among the States and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unnecessarily encum-
bered by State legislation.   
Id. at 9. 
 138. Telegraph lines were often placed along railroad tracks, and railroad tracks were designated 
as federal post roads by statute.  See id. at 3–4.  Under this line of reasoning, some, but not all, tele-
graphs could fall under the power to regulate post roads.  But this would not explain Congress’s power 
over newer forms of telecommunications, like radio or television, that do not make use of statutorily 
designated post roads. 
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late any new form of telecommunications technology and telecommuni-
cations network that extended interstate or internationally.  Under my 
approach, it makes perfect sense that the first Federal Radio Act of Au-
gust 13, 1912 was passed under the commerce power—not the power to 
establish post offices—and that early regulation of radio was originally 
placed in the Commerce Department before being handed off to an in-
dependent agency, the Federal Communications Commission.139  To be 
sure, the early Radio Acts arose out of concerns about navigation—
another form of intercourse—but they extended to all uses of radio.  In 
short, we should think about communications networks as technologies 
that fall within the scope of the constitutional power to regulate “com-
merce” just as we have come to understand new communications tech-
nologies as falling within the constitutional protections afforded 
“speech.” 
Barnett objects that if “commerce” means “intercourse,” then it 
would include the power to regulate sexual intercourse.140  I do not think 
this is a very serious problem.  Today “intercourse” primarily means sex-
ual intercourse.  In the eighteenth century, sexual intercourse was a spe-
cial type of intercourse—hence the additional adjective—rather than the 
general concept of business, diplomacy, and interaction that the Framers 
were concerned with.  People in the late eighteenth century also spoke of 
sexual relations as “sexual commerce” and “sexual congress.”  But that 
does not mean that that the words “commerce” or “Congress” in the 
Constitution refer to sexual intercourse or that the power to regulate 
“commerce” gave Congress a general power to regulate sexual relations.  
Nevertheless, Barnett is correct that the power to regulate commerce in-
cludes the power to regulate at least some sexual conduct.  Congress can 
regulate interstate prostitution or interstate travel to facilitate sex be-
cause it crosses state lines or uses interstate telecommunications net-
works.  At the same time, substantive guarantees of sexual autonomy 
limit how the federal government can regulate sexual relations. 
 
 139. See Act of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 287, § 1, 37 Stat. 302, 302 (giving the Secretary of Commerce the 
power to issue broadcast licenses).  Following the decision in United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 
F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926), Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, providing for a 
Federal Radio Commission and bestowing specific powers over licensing and regulation on the Secre-
tary of Commerce.  See id. § 5, 44 Stat. at 1164–65.  This legislation, in turn, was repealed and replaced 
by the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. §§ 151–161, 201–276, 301–399b, 401–416, 501–510, 527–573, 601–615b), which created the pre-
sent-day Federal Communications Commission.  See also Records of the Radio Service and the Radio 
Division 1910–34, U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES RECORDS ADMIN., http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-
fed-records/groups/173.html#173.2 (tracing history from the original Radio Service to the Federal 
Communications Commission) (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 140. Barnett, supra note 121 (manuscript at 114–15, 141). 
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X. THE AUDIENCE FOR LIVING ORIGINALISM 
Sanford Levinson’s article provocatively compares me to Pablo Pi-
casso.141  He argues that although Picasso overturned existing assump-
tions about art, Picasso was, and remained, a representational artist  
rather than an abstract artist.  Picasso’s goal was to change the way we 
thought about how to represent life in our art.  He shocked the art world 
in order to make people think again about the point of 
representationalist art.  In the same way, Levinson argues, although I am 
overturning widely shared assumptions about originalism, I remain first 
and foremost committed to constitutional fidelity.  My goal is to change 
how people think about fidelity to the Constitution, and in particular, to 
the original meaning of the text.  
Levinson continues his comparison by asking whether, after Living 
Originalism, conservative originalists will have to change the way they do 
constitutional interpretation.142  This assumes, however, that the audience 
for the book is primarily conservative originalists. 
It is true that at various points in the book I am critical of conserva-
tive originalism and show how conservative originalists must inevitably 
compromise their own theories of constitutional legitimacy in order to 
accommodate the modern state.  But Living Originalism is neither an at-
tempt to hoist conservative originalists on their own petards nor an at-
tempt to show, once and for all, why originalism is a failure.  Quite the 
contrary, I am attracted to originalism because it reveals things about our 
protestant constitutional culture that liberals, especially, have forgotten. 
In this book, and in its companion volume, Constitutional Redemp-
tion, I have argued that originalism is a dissenter’s theory, a theory for 
people in dark times.  It gives people a place to stand and leverage to at-
tack aspects of the Constitution-in-practice that they find unjust or un-
true to their vision of the Constitution.  Conservatives turned to 
originalism in the 1970s because they believed that the country had taken 
a wrong turn.  Over the next several decades, conservative scholars at-
tempted to theorize originalism, but the impetus for originalism was not 
scholarly but revolutionary; it sought to return the Constitution to the 
right path in the eyes of political conservatives. 
In many respects, conservatives have succeeded.  They have used 
the processes of living constitutionalism to build out—in many but not all 
respects—a version of the Constitution that is more conservative than 
the one we had in the early 1970s.  The great irony of conservative at-
tacks on living constitutionalism is that the Constitution-in-practice today 
reflects the living constitutionalism of movement conservatives. 
 
 141. Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin As the Picasso of Constitutional Theorists, 2012 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 711, 711–13. 
 142. Id. at 717. 
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One of the goals of Living Originalism is to ask conservative 
originalists to reflect on their own practices and to see why a model of 
constitutional development consisting solely of ratification and Article V 
amendment is incomplete; it does not give an adequate account of why 
the Constitution enjoys its current democratic legitimacy or succeeds as 
our law today.  Indeed, it cannot even account for modern constructions 
that conservatives themselves support.  Although some conservatives 
may resist the account of originalism and living constitutionalism in Liv-
ing Originalism, it is the best account of how the conservative movement 
changed the Constitution-in-practice during the last forty years. 
Most of the constitutional theorists in the United States, however, 
are liberals, not conservatives.  Living Originalism has a message for 
them too.  And that message is not, “you were right all along.”  Rather, it 
is that liberal living constitutionalists have become too conservative in a 
different sense, too risk averse and too defensive.  They have become the 
old fogies of American constitutional theory.  In a conservative age, 
many liberals have assumed an almost instinctive and reflexive posture 
against ideas like originalism, constitutional fidelity and the importance 
of text, structure, and history.  They have assumed, without justification, 
that the past is against them, that the work of the adopters is incorrigible, 
that the constitutional text is unhelpful if not irrelevant, and that their 
only hope is to cling defensively to the precedents of the Warren and ear-
ly Burger Courts and shield them against the ravaging hordes of con-
servative originalism.  In so doing, liberals have unwittingly bought into 
the conservative critique of the past forty years: that the original meaning 
of the Constitution—the Constitution of the Founders, Framers, and 
Adopters—is inconsistent with the values that liberals treasure, and 
therefore must be gotten around, ignored, or replaced with beneficent 
precedents from the good old liberal days, when liberals dominated the 
national political process. 
Such an approach is not only feckless, defeatist, and defensive, it is 
false to the great traditions of liberal constitutionalism that have secured 
liberty and equality for increasing numbers of Americans, and indeed, 
have been so successful that they have become central to the meaning of 
the Constitution for liberals and conservatives alike.  One of the reasons 
why conservatives have had such difficulty making their versions of 
originalism work is that so much of the constitutional tradition we now 
hold dear owes so much to the previous struggles of liberal constitutional 
actors. 
All of which is not, I repeat, intended to let my liberal colleagues off 
the hook.  Liberal constitutionalists must relearn a lesson well under-
stood by Hugo Black: originalism is their friend, not their enemy; and the 
Constitution and its text, its history, and its structure really is on their 
side.  
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The intended audience for Living Originalism is not restricted to 
conservative originalists, asking them to mend their ways.  It is also 
aimed at liberal nonoriginalists, who have viewed originalism either as an 
intellectual joke or a dangerous contagion of thought.  By running away 
from text and history, liberals have debilitated their natural strengths and 
undermined their deep connections to the American constitutional tradi-
tion. 
It is high time that liberals recognized that the Constitution is more 
than the burdensome chains of ancient ancestors.  Properly understood, 
it is a document of redemption.  Focusing on judicial doctrine and the 
latest pronouncements of the Supreme Court places reverence in precise-
ly the wrong place because it misunderstands the wellsprings of constitu-
tional development.  Liberal constitutionalism succeeded in the twenti-
eth century because liberals once offered their fellow Americans a 
powerful political and constitutional vision that did not take existing 
precedents as sacrosanct, that was not content to rest with the comforts 
of common-law development but sought constitutional transformation, 
that did not perpetually worry about what Justice Kennedy would do, but 
sought to mobilize political constituencies for a more honorable vision of 
our Constitution. 
Liberals must learn the lesson that conservatives learned during the 
dark days when they were out of power.  Originalism is for dissenters, for 
reformers, for people discontented with the status quo who want their 
country back.  If you care about the Constitution, you cannot run away 
from its text or history.  If you want to redeem the Constitution, you 
must take its text seriously and stop worshiping at the shrine of judicial 
idolatry.  Battered by a generation of conservative jurisprudence, Ameri-
can liberals have gradually come to realize that the Constitution is not 
simply the work of courts.  Now they must realize that, as with all other 
citizens, the Constitution belongs to them, and always has. 
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